34 



86. Suppose sight bestowed on a person born l:)lind ; be- 

 fore receiving it, lie feels the pleasing hope of receiving a new 

 source of pleasure and ardently desires it ; on its reception he 

 feels a new organic pleasure, and after its reception he is re- 

 joiced at the acquisition ; surelj' this hope, this desire, the 

 organic pleasure of vision, and the subsequent jo_?/, are percep- 

 tions very different from each other. 



87. It were tedious, and, 1 hope, superfluous, to shew the 

 distinction of tlie perceptions that originate in aftectibihty 

 from the j)lcasures and pains inherent in those of the inia- 

 o-ination and other faculties which have been already men- 

 tioned ; but it is proper to observe, that the inind is perfectly 

 passive in their production, and cannot excite them by a 

 mere act of the will, no more than the ]icrcc})tions of iustc ; 

 they are therefore caused by the Great Author of Nature, 

 acting differently on different predefined occasions, according 

 to pre-establiscd laws. 



88. The pleasing and painful perceptions attributed to af- 

 fcctibility, may, in the point of view in which I here consi- 

 der them, be i-educed to three general heads ; Emotions, de- 

 sires, and sentiments, all are susceptible of degrees, all are 

 pleasing, or painful, or indeterminate, and when excessive, 

 lilay be called passions. 



8,9. These perceptions are as incapable of being defined as 

 sensations, that is, the perceptions of the senses, tastes, smells, 



colours, 



