59 



it ma}' be defined the desire of equality. It is sometimes 

 taken for the desire of surpassing others ; but I think impro- 

 I^erly. Emulation is just, but the desire of excelHng others 

 is not always just, but frequently malevolent, and borders 

 on the detestable sentiment of envy*. I applaud Caesar, who 

 could bear no superior; but detest Pompey, who could suffer 

 no equal. 



184. Desire of distinction. — This desire is manifestly selfish, 

 as it urges to the endeavour of attracting the attention of 

 others to one's self. It is honorable or vicious, ridiculous or 

 indifterent, according to the means it employs to attain its 

 object. When it excites to pursuits conducive to the happi- 

 ness of the whole, or any large portion of the human species, 

 it is laudable ; when on the contrary it aims at success by the 

 commission of crimes that astonish mankind, such as that of 

 Eratostrates, who set fire to the temple of Ephesus, it excites 

 horror and detestation. But it is still more hateful when it 

 aims at admiration, (a sentiment which men have hitherto 

 been stupid enough to bestow on many monsters) by the op- 

 pression and conquest of unoffending nations. Nay I have 

 seen some so silly as to feign drunkenness to attract attention 

 by their extravagancies : — in such it is truly contemptible. To 

 endeavour to attain distinction by superior skill or adroitness, 

 ill particular amusements or exercises, is perhaps mere mat^ 



I 2 ter 



* Yet I ow n that in Latin JEmulatio is capable of both senses. See the profound and 

 accurate treatise of Jlr. Hill on Latin St/nonimes, 



