)64 



197. They differ fron emotiotis, as these arise from facts or 

 events, and not from opinion. And from desires, as these 

 excite to actions. Whereas sentiments, merely as such, may 

 subsist without any tendency to action, though it mnst be 

 allowed that desires frequently originate from them. 



198. There is one sentiment however of a mixt nature, as 

 comprizing both a desire and an emotion, namely, hope, which 

 is compounded of desire and expectation ; it is therefore sus- 

 ceptible of various degrees, according to the strength of the 

 desire, and the apprehended probability of the object ex- 

 pected. 



Sentiments favourable to ourselves or to others are pleasing ; 

 those that are unfavourable are displeasing or painful. 



199. Self estimation is the just value which a man sets on 

 his character, conduct and upright intentions. It is often, 

 though improperly mistaken for pride.* Content and satis- 

 faction seem to me rather negations of desire than positive 



sentiments. 



200. Pride consists in an overrated estimation of our own 

 merit, power, rank, knowledge or other abilities beyond their 

 real importance, or of the reputation we have gained, or the 

 «steem in which our merit or abilities are held or (as we 

 suppose) ought to be held by others. 



201. Fresumption 



• See some just and subtle remarks on this subject in 2 Edgworth on Educatiou, p. 

 $6, in SVo. 



