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it, one does not differ from another; tlierefore thei*e can 

 be no reason, why God should have placed bodies, in 

 space, after one particular manner, and not otherwise. 

 But, if space is nothing else, bijit that ordei- or relation, 

 and nothing at all without bodies, but the possibility of 

 placing them; then, two states, to wit, that which now 

 is, and another, supposed the reverse, would not at all 

 differ from each other. Their difference would only be 

 found, in our chimerical supposition of the reality' of 

 space: but, in truth, one would be exactly the same as 

 the other; they being absolutely indiscernible (undistin- 

 guishable), and consequently, leaving no room to inquire 

 for the reason of the preference of one to the other. 



Clarke. Undoubtedly, nothing happens without a suffi- 

 cient reason, why it is, rather than not; why thus, rather 

 than otherwise: but, in things perfectly indifferent, mere 

 mil is that sufficient reason; as, in the present instance, 

 >vl^y matter wa§ created in one place, rather than in ano- 

 ther; all places being originally alike. And the case is 

 the same, even though space were nothing real, but only 

 the mere order of bodies:, for it would still be indifferent, 

 whether three equal particles should be placed in the or- 

 der a, b, c, or in the order b, a, c; for different spaces 

 are equally distinct, though perfectly alike. Besides, if 

 space were nothing real, but the mere order of bodies, it 

 would follow, that, if the earth, sun, and moon, had been 

 placed where the remotest fixed stars now are, and in the 

 same order an(V idistanee, with regard to one another, as 



they 



