205 



Law. I can form no other notion of space, than either, 

 first; as the mere negation or absence of matter: or, se- 

 condly; as the extension of body, abstractedly considered, 

 as separate from any particular body.* 



Of space, considered as the absence or negation of 

 matter, we may have a positive idea, as Mr. Locke has 

 fully shewn, B. II. c. viii. §. 4, 5. as well as of silence, 

 darkness, and many other privations. But, to argue from 

 such an idea, that space is something external, and has 

 a real existence, is as little i-easonable as to say, that, 

 because we have an idea of darkness, different from that 

 of light, therefore, darkness must be something positive, 

 and has as real an existence as light has. 



To say, that space must have existence, because it has 

 some properties, for instance, penetrability, or the capa- 

 city of receiving bodies; seems to me the same, as [to 

 say, that silence must be something, because it has the 

 property of admitting sound. 



To attribute extension, or parts to space, according to 

 the first notion given of it, would be the same, as to 

 talk of the extension or parts of absence, or any other pri- 

 vation. 



Sharpe. To suppose that space is nothing but the ab- 

 sence of matter, is absurd; for, if we suppose two walls 



VOL. X. D d not 



* He adds a third mode of conceiving it, which is not, indeed, his own, 

 but rather Cudworth's; namely, that of a subject, or substratum of exten- 

 sion, in abstracto. Of this, as too subtile, and scarcely intelligible, I shall 

 take no notice. 



