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succession. So also, the duration of an agreeable state 

 of mind appears short, even though it should co-exist 

 ^ith many successive perceptions; because, the pleasure 

 arising from them, and not their mere succession, is that 

 which chiefly occiipies the attention. 



On the other hand, when the attention is not attracted 

 to any particular perception, but wanders, with indifference 

 or disgust, from each of the ideas that present themselves, 

 their number is increased; and as the mind flies rapidly 

 from one to another, their number being thus increased, 

 the time appears longer. 



For a similar, but a much stronger reason^ when we 

 are in a painful state, its apparent duration is much 

 longer than the real:, its termination being every instant 

 coveted, the succession of these instants is strictly at- 

 tended to. 



A learned and profound metaphysician, endeavoured to 

 prove, that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as 

 present time. The question, however, is merely verbaL 

 Undoubtedly, the present, taken in the strictest sense, de- 

 notes an indivisible instant, which can neither be called 

 time nor duration: but it is on a perceptible aggregate 

 of such instants, of which the memory is as vigorous, ov 

 neariy so, as the sensation corresponding with a single in- 

 stant, that we bestow tlie najne of present time, in the 

 usual sense. 



Another lively, amusing, but eccentric writer,, taking it 

 tor granted, that time consists only in the succession of 



our 



