222: 



And, yet, eternity cannot be said. to be a., perpetual nisi*a»}f,T. 

 as some Have called it; for that is an express contradic-f^ 

 tion, and even more glaringly contradictory, than the 

 punctum sfans of some scholastics; for instant denotes the ■ 

 minutest portion of time or dm-ation, and perpetual, thej 

 greatest duration. • ,■,!;■;)(! 



. Hence, we may learn the true import of some usual ex-"' 

 pressions. -noo ri-'' 'id 



From all eternity; that is, without beginning. 



To all eternity; that is, without ever ending. 



Hence, also, we may collect, that eternity cannot be 

 called a quantity; for its notion implies no magnitude 

 Avhatsoever, but barely existence unlimited; and, therefore, 

 cannot be said to be infinite, nor even equivalent to an 

 infinite succession; fori such a succession is impossible, and 

 purely chimerical. i 



The notion of eternity is positive, and not merely nega- 

 tiv^e, as Locke supposes; though it includes a double ne- 

 gation. For notions, that are commonly called negative,* 

 or privative, are those which directly import the non-ex- 

 istence or absence of something positive; as darkness does 

 that of light, silence that of sound, death the cessation of 

 life, &c.: whereas eternity directly imports existence; and, 

 indirectly, the absence of something positive, namely, a 



i . beginning; 



* I have substituted the term noticns for that of ideas, which Locke has 

 employed too generally. The word idea should never be used to denote any 

 thing, but representations of objects perceived by sense. 



