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all which is true. But their inference, that the effect, ret 

 suiting from an eternally omnipotent cause, could also be 

 eternal, is inadmissible; as causation essentially requires 

 priority of existence: without priority it could not be un- 

 derstood; it would be perfectly unintelligible. — And the 

 reply they make to this exactly confirms it; for they say, 

 that priority of natttre is sufficient. Now, what else is 

 priority of nature, but that priority, which the nature or 

 notion of causation essentially implies, namely, that of 

 existence? Any other feigned priority is unintelligible. — 

 Their further assertion, that, according to this statement, 

 an infinite succession of ages must have been possible, 

 before the creation of any being, is perfectly chimerical: 

 not only because the interval betwixt the creation, and 

 the pre-existence of the Creator, is unknown, as already 

 said; but, also, because an infinite succession is impos- 

 sible, even in the divine ideas; a commencement being 

 essential to succession, as I shall now demonstrate. 



Mr. Locke says, we derive the idea of eternity from 

 those of succession, and duration, by adding the periods 

 of duration as often as vre please; and thus suppose it 

 a duration, exceeding as many such periods as we can 

 recl^on,* without ever coming to an end. Now, it seems 

 to me very clear, that this is rather a fruitless attempt 

 to gain an idea, or rather notion of eternity, than an 

 actual acquisition of that notion: for, after all these at- 

 tempts, 

 * B. II. c. xiv. §.28,. SI, SS./and c. xvi. §.*8. 



