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tempts, we are as far from gaining it as we were at first; 

 as he himself acknowledges. Hence, he thinks, that " if 

 " we cannot separate succession from any duration what- 

 " soever, our idea of eternity can be nothing Ijut that of 

 •' infinite succession of the moments of duration, wherein 

 " anry thing does exist."* 



The notion, however, of an actual infinite succession of 

 jiioments, implies an evident absurdity: for such a succes- 

 sion should consist of as many years, nay millions and 

 centillions of years, as it should of moments; and thus 

 the whole, and the parts composing the whole, would be 

 equal. If we suppose an infinite number of years, as- 

 suredly the number of moments, of which those years 

 consist, must be still greater, and exceed infinity; which 

 is absurd. Thus, if an infinite succession of moments had 

 passed before the creation of the world, must it not be 

 increased by the number of them that have elapsed be- 

 twixt that time and the present? 



And, as to the eternity of our world, let it be consi- 

 dered, that motion, namely, a successive progression round 

 a common center, is necessarily attributable to those pla- 

 nets, which form what we call the world: and that our 

 globe, in particular, includes numberless beings, that exist ' 

 in endless succession to each other. Now, an unoriginated 

 or eternal succession, implies an absurdity, as has been 

 just shewn; and may be farther demonstrated thus. 



From 



* Chap. xvii. §.16. 



