the true nature of Instinct. 13 



in no wise moral ; for, as already observed, no one in this case 

 •will imagine that the dog either reflects upon his gratitude, or is 

 pleased with it as a moral quality. On the contrary, it is plain 

 that the animal's delight is solely owing to its consciouti mind 

 being determined to the exercise of its natural qualities or inclina- 

 tions, which are those of morally unconscious obedience and friend- 

 ship to man ; this being the end for which he is created. 



The horse, who in his aptitude for war discovers a quality neces- 

 sary to render him instrumental in redressing the injuries of man, 

 is characterised as an emulous and a generous animal; yet neither 

 generosity nor emulation, considered as moral qualities, are objects 

 of reflection to him ; if they were, miserable indeed would be the 

 fate of the devoted charger, whose latter existence is spent in the 

 metamorphosis of a poor, patient, unpitied hack. But in the 

 adorable economy of the Creator, it is provided that the sufferings 

 of this noble animal shall be natural merely : he is incapable of 

 being made conscious by reflection, either of the generosity, the 

 emulation, or the pride, which his actions may have exhibited : 

 although he has shewn them all, they have not become objective to 

 him, inasmuch as he is unfurnished with a morally conscious soul, 

 by which alone this could be effected ; and it is happy for him that 

 neither glory nor emulation can be attributed to him, otherwise 

 than as the unconscious subject in which those high qualities are 

 Exhibited. 



The mutual fidelity between the sexes, observable in doves and 

 other birds, forms a distinguished feature in moral instinct ; yet we 

 cannot suppose that the virtue of chastity or of conjugal fidelity is 

 at all intended by the creature, or attributable to it ; although its 

 actions are precisely the same as if such moral end were contem- 

 plated and intended by it : the polygamous species, indeed, have 

 a claim equally as good as the monogamous, to the virtue of chas- 

 tity, as far as regards their ozrn conscious nature. But surely 

 there must be moral powers which act upon and guide the natures 

 of animals in order to produce these eff'ects, while the creature is 

 accessary, in apparent freedom, and unconscious of the power 

 4ha9 exerted on it ; the wonderful exhibition of conjugal and social 

 uflections in some spec'ei of marine animals, in the Trkhecki Uo- 



