the true nature of Instinct. 27 



a deduction of intellect within tlie conscious perception of the sub- 

 ject whose actions exhibit it : — insiinet is a similar deduction of 

 intellect, not within, but above the conscious perception of the 

 subject whose actions exhibit it. For a consciousness of possessing 

 and exercising such intelligence cannot exist without elevating its 

 subject to that intellectual freedom which is the proper and dis- 

 tinguishing characteristic of human rationality. 



If we ascend to the higher classes of animals, fewer instances 

 occurof those operations which include in them principles of science; 

 and the actions of this character which are to be observed among 

 such animals, do not appear to arise from a conscious free principle, 

 but to be the result of a dictation, similar to that by which the ope- 

 rations of the insect world are carried on ; as in the case of the 

 Beaver in the construction of his dam and hut. In the higher orders 

 of animals, indeed, we lose sight of the more astonishing displays 

 of science which abound in some of the inferior tribes, as in in- 

 sects ; — as if to mark that such science is not the conscious property 

 of the brute nature. Thus the Mammalia appear to be more 

 particularly the subjects, in which a moral intelligence is opera- 

 tive, and thus are capable of being rendered more immediately 

 instrumental to the moral uses to which many species of them ae 

 directed by man : whereas the insect tribes appear to be more 

 particularly the subjects in which a scientific intelligence is dis- 

 played ; I say more particularly^ because the agencies in all cases 

 are evidently both moral and scientific, although operating di- 

 versely, so as to produce the appearance of such distinction ; for 

 in every case the iiilluent agency must be moral as regarding 

 the end ; and scientific as regarding the means ; and in the larger 

 quadrupeds the effects of moral intelligence are as finely illustrated' 

 by the Horse, the Elephant, the Camel and the Dog, as are the 

 effects of scientific intelligence in the operations of insects. In every 

 case in which science is displayed in (he actions of (juiidrupeds, it is 

 evidently, as respects the creatures, as much above any conscious 

 perception of their own, as it is in the case of insects: — in this 

 respect the Bee and the Beaver are both on a par, and it would be 

 unreasonable to concede a perception of science to the latter, and at 

 same time to deny it to the former. Neither does the Dog possess 



