166- An Inquiry respecling the true nature of Instinct. 



template his non-contiugent a{;ts also ; and not his own merely, 

 but those of other animals, and of Man, and indeed all the phaeno- 

 mena around him; it is impossible to limit the operation of a 

 principle essentiaUy free : it therefore follows, that Intelligence, 

 though present in Instinct, exists in it in a form differing from the 

 reason of Man : Instinct is a type of Reason, allied to it by ana- 

 logy, but not by affinity, as before observed. 



It is to the difference of the conscious reception of the principle 

 of Mind, whicii, there is every reason to believe, is in its origin one 

 •with that of Life, that the different created Beings owe their true 

 distinction, Man alone appears gifted with the conscious recep- 

 tion of this principle in freedom ; to this he owes his consciousness 

 of knowledge ; it is this distinguishing and glorious faculty of 

 liberty which separates him from the Brute ; it is this which 

 capacitates him for, and is the true ground of, his immortality ! To 

 the want of this the Brute owes that measure of happiness, which 

 results from his not being able to contemplate the nature of happi- 

 ness or of misery ; — it is the want of this that deprives his suffer- 

 ings of their sting. Finally, it is this which draws that impassable 

 barrier between the most barbarous Savage and the most sagacious 

 Brute, which no human ingenuity will ever be able to explain away. 



We are now arrived at the point at which it becomes necessary, 

 towards the further development of our subject, to take into con- 

 sideration the nature of Principles of Action ; so far as the consi- 

 deration of them affects its elucidation. 



Looking at principles of action as they exist with respect to our 

 own consciousness, they appear to exhibit themselves under two 

 distinct forms ; the first of which may be called Reasoning Intelli- 

 gence, — a^ giving birth to those actions, which we are conscious of, 

 from their being the result of a mensurate reflection and deduc- 

 tion ; the second, Immediate, or Intuitive Intelligence, — as giving 

 birth to those actions, which, as to our consciousness, do not ap- 

 pear to be the result of a mensurate reflection, or of any reasoning 

 deduction. Of this latter character are the actions of habit, 

 wiiich might indeed be termed human instincts; being distinguished 

 from brute instincts by the circumstance, that they are generated 

 by the conscious intelligent principle. 



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