M. Frederic Cuvier^s Theory of Habit. 169 



It is indeed true that the principle of Intelligence does in its 

 progress assume the form of an Active Principle ; because final 

 causes require such a modification : but are we hence to conclude 

 that it changes its essence likewise ? — and that human action, in 

 proportion as it becomes more perfect, is really assimilated more to 

 that of brutes ? It is true that the author, in the note p. 540,* 

 saves himself, in some measure, by quitting hold of essentials ; but 

 this, I contend, is not meeting the question : for essentials are 

 fairly involved in the consideration of the subject, and cannot with- 

 out confusion be separated from it. It is true, that in playing 

 on a musical instrument the mind operates in different modes at 

 the same time^ the one subordinate to the other ; but the mind 

 operates nevertheless in them all in a rational and proper manner : 

 the various actions are therefore the results of the intelligent 

 principle : though the final cause requires that our conscious atten- 

 tion should be principally directed, elevated, as it were, to the 

 sense and sentiment. 



It is surely more consistent to admit the doctrine of Mr. Dugald 

 Stewart, to which this of M. Cuvier is opposed — and to agree with 

 him, that if we can explain the actions of habit by the laws which 

 regulate the human mind, the principles of sound philosophy require 

 that we should not look for other causes. Besides, how, it may be 

 asked, does the Intelligent Principle separate itself from the un- 

 known (as to its essence) Mechanical Principle ? — and at what 

 point is the complete separation eifected ? No consistent an- 

 swers, I apprehend, can be made to these questions. 



Does not M. Cuvier, in this case, mistake the concentration of 

 intelligence itself, or some particular modification of it, for its 

 total absence? Is there no intelligence in the Mathematician's 

 immediate recognition of a particular formula ? — his quick and de- 

 cisive scientific combinations ? — and is not the immediate percep- 

 tion of relation, as the result of an intelligent power, equally obvious 



• " Je n'ai pas bosoinde faire remarquer que je n' envisajje ici que la succes- 

 iion naturelle des faitH, et que jc ne m' occupe ni de Icur cause ni du principe 

 general de I'activitc." 



\0h. I. M 



