M. Frederic Cuvier's Theor}/ of Habit. 171 



tible steps of comparison passing through the consciousness, we 

 yet cannot, with any truth, deny Intelligence to be the moving 

 cause of such act; merely because it is not seen, as when directing 

 movements on a chess board. Besides, after performing them, we 

 can reflect upon them, and discover, by reflection, that is, by 

 analysing the intelligence of the act, the degree of Intelligence 

 involved in it. When we reflect on the actions which Presence of 

 Mind has produced, they sometimes present themselves to our con- 

 sciousness accompanied with an emotion of surprise, almost as if 

 they had been in a manner the results of accident, and not of lu- 

 telligence j while yet we feel assured of the contrary, since the act 

 has been rational. A lower measure of this same feeling no doubt 

 accompanies the performance of any very skilful operation ; for 

 instance, in music. The operator seems to himself, as it were, 

 possessed of a sort of magical power of execution ; and this very 

 feeling could not exist, were he not at the same time conscious 

 that it wajj the result of the Faculty of Intelligence exerted in a 

 peculiar mode ; for it is the sense of the presence of this intelli- 

 gence in action that conveys the sentiment. In the illustration 

 of the operation of Intelligence, by tracing a conscious analysis in 

 the mind, at the time of performing such actions, M. Cuvler thinks 

 our countryman Mr. Dugald Stewart has failed. This failure, 

 however, is not material to the question at issue ; nor is it possH>l« 

 to illustrate in detail the modus operandi of such cases. Thus 

 much, however, may be said in the way of definition. 



Actions of Habit (at least the class we are speaking of) are the 

 results of an intelligt ut volition developed in sudden perception, 

 rational in its nature J and which must be therefore included in 

 the idea of Intelligence. 



The term. Habit, as signifying an essential cause, or principle of 

 action, is to be distinguished from the same term as expressing the 

 idea of proucness, derived from reiteration ; since this determina- 

 tion of the mind, or proneness, is equally applicable to analysis, 

 and particular modes of thought, as to the principles which 

 give rise to actions without any reasoning deduction. The sense 

 of the term Habit, which we have been considering, is that of an 



