Nature of Memory in Brule Animals. 357 



<of the Insect is formed upon as high a degree of Instinctive Per- 

 •ception as that of the Dog : this Perception appears to be in its 

 highest degree, and thus to form the highest conscious nature 

 Iirutes are capable of, in those animals in whom it is manifested 

 in the contingent form ; since the guiding intelligence here ope- 

 rates more tacitly, and apparently with a less forcible power on 

 the conscious mind ; thus leaving to it a stronger analogous ap- 

 proach to freedom and liberty in effecting its discriminations ; as 

 in the Horse and the Dog. Instinctive Perception thus diifers 

 in degree in its subject's; but it diflFers from Proper Intelligence in 

 Tcind: or in scientific terms, and as the converse of a previous 

 statement, the various manifestations of the former, among them- 

 selves, are related by affinity ; but to the latter by analogy. 



If the view here taken be consistent with the truth, it will be 

 conformable to experience in Nature. I therefore proceed to 

 examine the principle laid down, in its application to the Brute 

 Memory; first, however, noticing what the quality of this memory 

 appears to be, in comparison with that of Man. 



Memory appears to form the basis of the mental organization, 

 and is common to man and the brutes ; although in the latter it 

 must be differently modified, inasmuch as the ordinary ideas of 

 objects must dift"er in their nature, from similar ideas in man. 

 The principle of proper intelligence, from and by which man ac- 

 quires and contemplates ideas, is the cause of their possessing an 

 intellectually definite and specific character, diiferent from any 

 quality that can have place in the ideas of brutes : the relations 

 under which ideas are viewed by the latter being thus different 

 from those under which man regards objects, will of course stamp 

 a different quality upon such ideas in the case of the brute ; and 

 the idea of an Ox or of an Ass respecting even those objects most 

 familiar to him, such as a tree, a tuft of grass, or a thistle, must 

 differ exceedingly from the human idea of either of those ob- 

 jects. The ideas of the brute may be called ideas of Simple 

 Perception — ttiose of man ideas of Intelligence. 



Now from what has been already advanced, it necessarily fol- 

 lows, that tlie ideas of brutes must be subjected to the followr 

 ing laws. Their ideas of the past must be all spontaneous, or 



