146 
The Reader must accomodate the theories for him- 
self: how Man’s mind could have had an independent 
origin, whilst his Frame had itself been derived from an 
origin common to the Organisms. Perhaps Mr. Wallace 
took note of this dilemma and, holding the doctrine he 
did concerning the independent origin of Man’s mind, 
saw how fatal it was to the theory of descent founded 
upon Anatomy; and has endeavoured to avoid its horns. 
Indeed these conflicting theories and doctrines seem 
to upset the Evolutionist’s view so far as Man is concerned 
and if that view be false in his case, how can it be accep- 
ted as true in any other case. Shall we conceive of the 
Creator allowing Nature, working by second Causes (or 
Herself the Second Cause), to evolve all living forms, save 
one, freighted with intelligence from protoplasm ; but in 
the sole instance of Man to have zmmediately created 
Him. 
Upon Psychological Evolution, Romanes differs from 
Herbert Spencer, and from Fiske; from whom Lewes 
differs in opinion. While Mill and Bain, who ignore 
psychical heredity, are judged to be altogether out of 
court: Lewes regarded instinct as ‘lapsed intelligence.’ 
Spencer defined instinct as ‘compound reflex action.’ 
Romanes holds that Spencer’s view cannot be correct and 
instances ‘sneezing.’ ‘Vo one thinks of sneezing, or of 
the convulsions produced by tickling, as examples of instinc- 
tive actions; yet they are ‘compound reflex actions’ to 
a degree of compounding not easily paralelled, and cer- 
tainly much more so than any of the non-psychical adjust- 
ments which are given by Mr. Spencer as tlustrations of 
instinct.” 
But Philosophers may invent an elaborate terminol- 
ogy to convey their researches; and cast about for the 
motive guides of the instincts of the Snake, the Bee, the 
