x.\\i BIOGIL\.PmCAL SKETCH. 



party out, and then erected low semicircular works, with gabions and sand-bags, within 60 yards 

 of the trench. If it were attempted to drive them out of these, they brought up reserves, and a 

 regular action in the dark ensued. "SMien daylight broke the enemy opened fire with their big 

 guns to cover the ground, the result continually being that the rifle-works remained with the 

 enemy in the morning." 



" Somehow," writes Arthur Hay again, " the Russians always strike the right place. They 

 know perfectly well that we cannot advance our ' llight Attack ' until the Mamelon is taken. 

 The French have not advanced a yard during the last ten days, because the enemy oppose 

 them. AVe cannot advance because we should be taken in flank. Our fault is want of 

 vigour. There is no doubt that when bayonet meets bayonet we can beat the enemy, but we 

 do not accept the opportunities. With respect to the Mamelon it is the same thing; we 

 ought to have taken it before it was fortified. "We must end by taking it ; but now it is 

 fortified we cannot take the Tower without first taking the Mamelon. It was unfortified, 

 and we declined taking it. Now it is fortified, and we are prevented doing so. One thing we 

 frequently hear said, ' Oh, whenever we think fit we can shell them out of the Mamelon 

 work.' I don't believe we can shell them out ; but in the meantime we have let the work 

 be made, and we have to shell them out : it remains to be done. It is a new work, begun 

 under our eyes and finished under our batteries, which were erected to silence works several 

 hundred yards to the rear of it. This one is a lasting monument to the science, courage, and 

 energy of the Russians, and to our disgrace." 



On the 2nd of April, 1855, he wrote : — " I saw Peel to-day ; he is to have charge of the 

 naval guns on the right attack ; he took over charge yesterday, and has already protested at 

 the state of his batteries ; they are simply not shot-proof. I guessed this was the fact from 

 personal experience ; but this protest is a confirmation of my surmise. To begin with, in one 

 essential in a battery, namely the cover and protection given to the guns and crews, we are not 

 in a proper state to compete with the enemy. Working parties have been promised, and the 

 work of repairs, to a certain extent, will be performed. I will not trouble you with the 

 reasons why our batteries have been allowed to become so insecure. The enemy are acknow- 

 ledged to have more guns in position than the Allies. This is a fact, which can be established 

 by merely counting, aided by an opera-glass. But we are still going to silence the enemy's 

 guns. AVhy ■? Because we suppose they have not men enougli to man them. But on what is 

 this supposition based, for we know that from 10,000 to 12,000 sailors are in the fleet alone] 

 Oh ! because the deserters say so. Can you trust these deserters I Certainly. Now this 

 sounds plausible. But change the attack, and ask, ' Wliy don't you bring up an overpowering 

 artillery, 100 mortars, say, and reserves for 600 guns, and ammunition in proportion, and then 



