BlOGRArHICAL SKETCH. xxxiii 



On the 15th of June orders arrived directing the Brigade of Guards to prepare to move to 

 the front. This was joyful intelligence, and the battalions marched up in fine order to the 

 plateau on the eve of the opening of the third bombardment. On the whole the supremacy of 

 the allied batteries was established after three days' fire, and hopeful anticipations were indulged 

 in that the assault which was fixed to take place on the 18th June, the anniversary of Waterloo, 

 would be successful. The attack was made, but it was repulsed with great loss to the Allies at 

 every point ; and the Guards, with whom Arthur Hay was doing duty, were not engaged in it. 

 There is no necessity now to dwell on the details of a day which caused such bitter grief and 

 disappointment to the Generals and the troops, and to none more than the Brigade and their 

 officers. Writing on that day, he thus points out the reasons of our failure : — 



" The main cause was the tremendous fire which the enemy were enabled to pour upon the 

 troops ; they could barely live. A great deal of confusion existed in our assaulting parties. 

 They were too small, and the combinations too intricate ; they were brought up badly in 

 driblets, and were never thoroughly formed ; when they left the trenches to attack, debouching 

 in Indian file, they were mowed down almost in detail." 



The General who had led the British army to victory at Alma and Inkerman did not long 

 survive its repulse from the Eedan ; and the severest censors of Lord Eaglan felt that no braver 

 soldier could be found than the veteran whose last moments, if not cheered by the shouts of a 

 victorious army, were at least brightened by the consciousness that he died at his post. Great 

 sickness broke out in the camps. At the same time the army sufi'ered much from despondency ; 

 a large proportion of men were killed daily by the enemy's sharp-shooters and shells ; within 

 a period of five weeks the French lost at least 18,000 men. Writing under date the 25th of 

 June, 1855, from on board H.M.S. ' Agamemnon,' where Lord Arthur had proceeded in order 

 to recruit after a severe attack of the prevalent epidemic, he comments upon the difficulties 

 that existed in arriving at any clear idea of the intentions of the generals of the allied 

 forces as to the future. The game played by the enemy was sufficiently clear — he merely kept 

 force sufficient to defend his works on the south side. The garrison was relieved from the army 

 in position, and the casualties replaced by periodical draughts on his reserves. The daily 

 loss of the English and French at this period was what it would be in a campaign in the open, 

 whilst an assault upon a few rifle-pits cost as much as a good battle ; altogether the advantages 

 lay with the enemy, who, after all, would lose but little in the event of the south side being 

 taken, and who well knew that this could not be effected Avithout a very heavy loss of life. 

 The ' Agamemnon ' was anchored almost abreast of Fort Constantine, and therefore commanded 

 a good view of the rear of the Malakoff, which was completely closed to the rear. It had, more- 

 over, a ditch and a work to cover the bridge, and it was quite possible to see the people going 



