BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. xlv 



would not have dreamed that refusing to take a town which was at first at our mercy would 

 eventually cripple an empire. The enemy have admitted to me their losses at 500,000 men. 

 Who could have foreseen that it would have required such a sacrifice to defend a town for ten 

 months ■? If we had taken Sebastopol the day after our army first appeared against it, a host of 

 lives would have been spared to the enemy, and I doubt whether peace would have been effected 

 so soon." 



He expressed great pleasure at the defeat of Government on the Kars question, and that 

 the allies had been saved from undertaking a campaign which must have been made with an army 

 powerful enough to beat the Russians at all points. "And where," he inquires, "is the army 

 able to do this 1 It is clear that the English army could not. I say an English army, because 

 that is a peculiar body. It consists of men who must be fed, clothed, and housed, at more 

 expense and trouble and with more luxury than labourers at home. An English general 

 has not only got to provide rations and forage for fighting men, men available on the day of 

 battle, but also for hosts of persons of all persuasions — newspaper correspondents, pathologists, 

 telegraphists, sanitary commissioners, army-works corps, and every kind of useless vagabond that 

 chooses to take it into his head to encumber an army. 70,000 men is the strength I have more 

 than once seen the English army estimated at in home speeches and newspapers ; but for men 

 read mouths. Some 70,000 rations are daily consumed ; bvit when we were at our greatest 

 strength, how did we stand on the ground \ With a sick list surprisingly small, we showed nearly 

 28,000 infantry. In five marches this strength would really dwindle to 20,000. Put the artillery 

 at 2000 and the cavalry at 5000, and you have our actual strength on the day of action at 35,000 

 instead of 70,000, or just half. March these men 50 miles, and what with sick, baggage- 

 guard men left at depots, and other casualties, the army would have dwindled, in round 

 numbers, to 25,000 men of all arms. No person is better aware than I that an English army 

 has a defective organization ; but it is because its system is not purely military. The whole 

 object of a military system (and the best test) is to put upon the field of battle the largest number 

 of effective troops. This ought to be the sole aim of a general. It is with this view that he will 

 take care of his sick, because on leaving hospital they return to his ranks as reserved soldiers. 

 In war humanity is a secondary consideration. Fortunately humanity is good and the best 

 policy ; and a good general will always feel it as his interest to feed his men well, so as to 

 prevent their falling sick, and thus guard against reducing his strength on the day of battle. 

 Our army will never be worth much until its members are all bond fide soldiers — all men 

 trained to the use of the rifle, and made subordinate by at least a two years' service under the 

 restraint of military discipline. But of this I despair. Within a fortnight after your reading 

 this letter I hope to be able to chat better stuff' than I scribble." 



h 



