4 An Inquiry respecting 



much resemble the operations of human intellect, that as before 

 observed, they may be said to represent and illustrate them. 



On this account considerable difficulty has been found in draw- 

 ing a distinct line between the conscious discriminative powers 

 of brutes, and those of human rationality ; and in affixing a true 

 character to the mental principles in which the actions of the brute 

 creation originate. 



Thus iu considering the nature of the essential principles of 

 brutes, philosophers have diverged into two extremes of opinion, 

 each opinion being the result of an opposite and partial train of 

 reasoning. One class, by referring all the essential powers of 

 brute action to the unassisted conscious mind of the creature, have 

 ascribed to the brute creation faculties of understanding and rea- 

 soning of the same kind with, and only differing in degree from, 

 the rationality of the human mind.* The other class, considering 

 the high nature of the essential powers themselves from which brute 

 action appears to proceed, and to which they may indeed be traced, 

 — powers which are so far exalted in intelligence above the common 

 nature of the creatures whose actions exhibit externally their 

 effects, as to lead the mind to look above the sphere of the crea- 

 ture's consciousness for a solution of their origin, — have considered 

 that the phcenomenaof brute action can be no otherwise explained, 

 than by referring it to the immediate operation of the divine energy. 

 The opinion expressed by Addison, who, following in the steps 

 of other philosophers, says that he was impressed with the belief 

 that the actions of brutes originate in immediate impression from 

 the first Mover, and " the divine energy acting in the creatures,+" 

 has indeed been deemed unphilosophical ; and, it must be admit- 

 ted, not without propriety, if this sentiment be taken to mean 

 that brutes are mere automata. But although the penetrating mind 

 of Addison obtained but an indistinct perception of the subject, his 

 hypothesis is undoubtedly deserving of attention. He clearly saw 



* Helvetius, De l'Esprit. torn, i, p. 2, et sq. edit. 1758. 



New System of Nat. Hist, of Animals, by Peter Hill, Edinburgh, 1791. 

 The author maintains, " that the laws of analytic reasoning do not justify the 

 opinion that the brutes act on any occasion absolutely without design." 



t Spectator, nos. 121, 122. 



