llw true, nature of Instinct. )3 



science and means, for the fulfilment of these ends, It yet cannot 

 look down with an approving or disapproving perception upon 

 the region or sphere of its natural powers ; it evidently has no 

 perception of any moral superiority in itself over the most vulgar 

 worm that crawls. But if brute creatures were capable of moral 

 consciousness, they would be capable of elevation in the scale of 

 being; and this little insect, the bee, judging from its actions, 

 would, were it capable of that species of consciousness, not only 

 rank above most of the larger classes of animals, but would, on 

 the score of fidelity and integrity, put human nature to the 

 blush. 



Were it not that much has been said in favour of the alledged 

 moral consciousness of brutes, it might perhaps be impertinent 

 to proceed further in the endeavour to disprove it ; but so strong 

 are appearances in its favour, that, although we deny the affirma- 

 tive in the abstract, by an unequivocal assent to the proposition, 

 that brutes are not accountable beings ; yet we are too ready to 

 admit it in particular instances, in which we are wont to ascribe 

 a moral consciousness to the particular moral action we see per- 

 formed by an animal. There is a strong tendency to mistake the 

 cause instrumental, for the cause principal, in this as in other 

 cases ; by which we are insensibly led to assign the sum total of 

 the attribute to the visible agent, without stopping to consider 

 further of the matter. Thus gratitude, which is a moral quality 

 in man, is thought to be moral also in the dog; but surely no> 

 one, upon mature consideration of the subject, will imagine that 

 the dog reflects on the inclination or desire he feels to act in a 

 manner which we view as grateful; and that he is pleased with 

 the survey and reflection ; — that the moral quality of his actions 

 becomes objective to him ; — aud yet this is absolutely necessary 

 in order to constitute a moral coiuciousness ; for to effect this, it 

 is not only necessary that the action be outwardly or in effect 

 moral, but that this moral action be reflected upon as such, in 

 order that its moral quality may be thus perceived and felt. 

 Moral consciousness can only be produced by the moral quality 

 of the action becoming objective — by its being reflected upon from 

 a superior eminence, and in a superior light, — by a soul within 



