Dr. Fleming's views considered. 157 



These performances of the Crow are thus deduced from a sup- 

 posed knowledge of power and of cause and effect proper to the 

 creature, thus from rational intelligence as a ground ; such know- 

 ledge being inferred as necessary to the production of the actions 

 in question. It is true that the author, aware of the delicacy of 

 the inference, arrives at it by rather a guarded process ; — " Were 

 we," he observes, " merely inactive spectators of the changes 

 which take place in the world, it is probable that the ideas of 

 reflection which would result from the contemplation of these, 

 would be limited to resemblance and succession. But as we 

 begin to act upon the objects around us, and produce in them 

 various changes, we acquire a knowledge of our own power. 

 When we see changes produced independent of us, we consider 

 it as the display of some other power. These changes, and the 

 efforts which have preceded them, excite our ideas of cause and 

 effect, means and ends." 



" That the lower animals, &c." he proceeds to observe, as 

 above quoted ; and he then illustrates the position by the case re- 

 cited. But it is surely too much to say, that because these actions 

 involve in them such a thing as the knowledge of power and of 

 cause and effect, such knowledge is to be attributed to the Crow. 

 It certainly comes more within the limits of the case to say, that 

 they are the results of simple perception in the creature, — that 

 au instinctive intuitive perception, independent of any effort 

 of intelligence on its part, of the fit and proper means of possess- 

 ing itself of its prey, accompanies the instinctive desire to obtain 

 it : thus that the wonderful discriminations alluded to are not 

 derived from any rational deduction, resulting from the un- 

 assisted faculties of the Crow ; — but are primarily induced by a 

 superior influence. Appetites, desires, and affections, have been 

 stated to include the whole of what constitutes the Instinctive 

 Powers,* but that such is not the case admits of satisfactory de- 

 monstration. It may be shewn that there must be an essential 

 intelligence, which, however complicated in its origin, as in- 

 volving the knowledge of power, cause, and effect, must develope 

 itself in the conscious mind of the animal in the form of simple^ 

 * Sec Philosophy of Zoology, vol. i. p. 243. 



