Psychiatry. — ''Concordance of the Laws of some Psychological 

 and Physiological Phenomena''. By Prof. E. D. Wiersma. 



(Communicated at the meeting of September 30, 1922). 



The phenomena of consciousness are attended with material 

 changes in the brain. There is an uninterrupted continuity in the 

 anatomic as well as in the psychic phenomena. The two groups of 

 phenomena run parallel. A change in the one will be accompanied 

 by a change in the other. Whether we consider the phenomena of 

 consciousness from the psychological or the physiological standpoint, 

 in both cases the result will be the same, because the changes in 

 the one differ from those in the other not intrinsically but only in 

 form. Memory, which we conceive to be the retention and repro- 

 duction of previous impressions, has been considered physiologically 

 and psychologically. First Aristotle and afterwards Bering have 

 looked upon it as a general function of the organised matter. Semon, 

 who has written a pre-eminent monograph on the Mneme, deemed 

 the ordinary terminology inadequate, as it concerned chiefly the 

 phenomena of consciousness. He, therefore, introduces other terms, 

 as engrams, i.e. the organic changes evoked by a stimulus; the 

 retention of those impressions, which afterwards may again come 

 to us as consciousnesses, is the mneme; and the stimuli by which 

 the action of the primary stimulus can be re-aroused, are termed 

 ekphoric stimuli. Under certain conditions permanent connections are 

 formed between the several engrams, which have been termed 

 "regular tracks". By the side of this anatomical interpretation the 

 psychological explanation may be put forward. We know for certain 

 that every impression leaves an after-effect in consciousness. Mental 

 tests on secondary function, psycho-analysis, the symptoms of hysteria, 

 hypnosis have conclusively established the existence of these after- 

 effects. That these after-effects may become consciousnesses again 

 through association, is borne out by self-observation and by ex[)eriment. 

 Thus the psychological conception may be formed diiectly, whereas 

 for the physiological we have tirst to pre-suppose all sorts of organic 

 changes, for we are still completely ignorant of the real existence 

 of the organic engrams and the regular tracks. In strictness this 



