42 THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIVING MATTBR. 



notes are sounded. Let us now, by an effort of the imagination 

 suppose that it were possible, by some extension of scientific 

 knowledge, for a man to directly inspect the workings of his own 

 cerebrum. There is nothing inconceivable in such a supposition. 

 Let us imagine further that it were possible for any one of us 

 not only to observe the intricate interweaving of the processes of 

 his own brain cells, but to be cognisant of every molecular tremor 

 which passed down those processes, and to be able even to follow 

 the vibrations of molecules and intricate dance of atoms as one 

 micro-chemical change leads to another in the mysterious 

 laboratory of the protoplasm of the nerve cell. Extend the 

 imagination as far as you please, and then ask yourselves 

 whether the nature of consciousness, of the thoughts that 

 accompany these molecular storms, becomes any clearer. If 

 you will allow me to anticipate your reply, it will be — " Not by 

 the least infinitesimal fraction." 



Granted that direct observation and experiment can here 

 avail us nothing, and that the nature of consciousness is 

 inconceivable, it might still be contended that the intimate 

 connection between matter and consciousness is not confined to 

 the solitary instance of the human cerebrum, that it is in some 

 sort common to all living matter. The argument would run 

 somewhat on these lines : Consciousness is known directly only 

 to the individual. By analogy and inference he naturally, 

 indeed inevitably, attributes a similar consciousness to his fellow 

 men. But the lower animals most nearly allied to ourselves 

 also exhibit, in an inferior degree, phenomena which in our 

 own species we should consider to be indicative of the possession 

 of consciousness, and by irresistible analogy we are led to 

 attribute consciousness to them also. This once granted, we 

 have a series of animal forms of gradually decreasing complexity, 

 in no part of which can we draw a line and say, here conscious- 

 ness ends. A similar line of reasoning may be applied to the 

 development of the individual. By insensible gradations, 

 therefore, we are led to attribute a consciousness of some sort to 

 the amoeba. If to the amoeba, then also to the white blood- 

 corpuscle, and to every animal or vegetable cell. 



It seems to me that if this line of argument be admitted we 

 could not stop here. If we attribute consciousness to every speck 

 of protoplasm, it would be equally easy, or equally difficult, to 



