(122) 



The physiology of tlie cortex of the brain is compelled to ac- 

 cept the theory of so-called parallelism between physiological and 

 psychical processes — for without this theorj all physiology as a 

 foundation of psychology is impossible — it is therefore required 

 that a special physiological modification in the central nervous 

 system correspond to every special psychical process. At once 

 however, a difficulty arises. 



Through self-observation, psychology knows a succession of diffe- 

 rent conscious states, but no more. It teaches nothing concerning 

 the way, in which this succession occurs. Physiology, therefore, has 

 to explain the way, in which this succession takes place. 



For this it uses the idea of association. It assumes that a phy- 

 siological modification in one group of cells can propagate along 

 fibres to another and bring about a new modification there. If it 

 is true, that in general only modifications in cells may be accom- 

 panied by conscious parallel processes, and not the processes pro- 

 pagating in the fibres, the fact that self-observation knows succession 

 and no more, is not strange. But the idea of association has a wider 

 application. 



It is its task to point out wiiat special phsysiological modification 

 corresponds to every special conscious condition. 



The characteristics of the former may be determined in different 

 ways, either by the place occupied by the cell-group which is modi- 

 fied, or by the combination of two or more co-acting cell groups. 

 By means of association this combination is possible in numberless 

 variations. 



To physiology taken in this sense, which aims at combining a 

 succession of conscious conditions with an association of physiological 

 parallel processes, the name of association-physiology has been given. 

 It is of course, rigorously a science of matter. It does not suffer itself 

 to be led astray in its views by the existence of conscious parallel 

 series. It states their existence, but keeps silent about their nature. 

 It treats conscious life as the life of an automaton, who perceives 

 scarcely anything of the processes going on in him, but who reacts 

 to some, by far the fewest in number, with the corresponding con- 

 scious parallel series. 



At all times a difficulty has presented itself to the association- 

 physiology. It cannot be contradicted that self-observation, in our wan- 

 ting to make movements, in our being attentive and in many 

 other conscious processes gives the impression, as if we were active 

 agents in the conscious processes. Whence this feeling of b)ing active ? 

 llow is it to be explained that self-observation misleads the subject 



