1416 
remembrance upon which the reproduction depends, is of a more or 
less questionable nature. When studying the protocols of the recognition 
of these figures, we see that the sensation of novel experience, 
evoked immediately after the incoming stimulus, is ousted after the 
analysis of the figure by a “conscience de déjà vu’, weak though 
this may be. In this respect they approximate the imagination type. 
It is plain then, that the course of the experiment upon the 
recognition of the primary figures varies considerably according as 
the reproduction in the interval js the resnlt of memory or the 
product of imagination. This accounts for the essential anomalies 
in the results obtained with P, whose experimentation, as we 
alluded to before, was drawing to a close, when our attention was 
directed to the diverse influences of memory-images and of images 
of imagination. Figures reproduced inaccurately, either as a whole 
or in part, are identified in one case, while in other cases they 
arouse a sensation of novel experience. This anomaly may be unreal. 
However, being destitute of any knowledge of the nature of the 
mental reproductions made in the interval, we are not in a position 
to assign the cause. 
The tabulated data lead to the following conclusion: recognition 
is inhibited by a more or less inaccurate representation, in so far 
as the latter evokes a complete or partial sensation of novel experience, 
the more so as the representation is farther removed from the 
primary stimulus. The considerable increment of the percentage of 
the “consciences de nouveau venu” and the rapid fall of the percentage 
of the recognitions in the first three columns reinforce our conclusion. 
The peculiar etfect of the inaccurate images of imagination upon 
the recognizing process, in contradistinetion to that of the inaccurate 
memory-images induces us to attribute the inhibition, affecting the 
later recognition, to the totally or partially false recognition — fausse 
reconnaissance — attending the more or less accurate and the 
inaccurate memory-images and which is lacking with the image of 
imagination. If, moreover, we bear in mind, that in the case of M— 
whose account is the only one we possess — all accurate images 
are memory-images, and, therefore, must be considered as true 
recognition-types, we are justified in ascribing chiefly to the latter 
the favourable influence upon the later recognition. 
An analysis of the times, required for the recognition of the 
primary stimuli, lends support to this view. 
A mental reproduction, as has been observed, does not affect only 
the nature of the phenomena in the recognizing process, but also 
the times needed for this process, 
