The Kev. James Wills on Dreams. 25 



When the dreams of the past night are such as may be described as in some 

 measure representing the ordinary incidents of reality, it is remarkable how 

 several successive dreams, without any interval of waking, will be recalled; and 

 this is the more to be remarked, as both theory and experience appear to prove 

 that it is in the deepest sleep, when the processes of the brain are most likely 

 to fall into some regular course of operation, that the most vivid and longest 

 dreams occur. To eradicate the recollection of such, the intervening intervals of 

 sleep have no power, as the real principle of recollection is not interfered with by 

 mere discontinuance. And it is evident that, in addition to this principle, there 

 may, as in the case already noticed, exisfan impression, or a continued affection 

 after waking, left by the wave of agitated thought. Such an assumption is pro- 

 bable, though not within the scope of theory. 



Generally when there is an utter incongruity in the ideas of a dream, it must 

 from the same reasoning appear, that any recollection will be impossible. The 

 occurrence of such instances must be rather matter of inference than of obser- 

 vation. Such seems to have been the description of the King of Babylon's 

 dream. Recalling this portentous dream, as detailed in the eleventh chapter of 

 Daniel, this application will be at once apprehended. In the structure of the 

 symbolic image there was not one tangible link of ordinary association, 

 but a sense of vague terror impressed on a superstitious mind. Distinct recol- 

 lection was not possible. The dream presented an aggregation of incongruous 

 members which, however apt to signify an unknown concurrence in the Future, 

 possessed no link of affinity with. anything in fact or nature. The monstrous 

 and spectral shadow left the king's mind under the impression of a mysterious 

 horror; but, as must have happened, the thing had " gone from him." 



This is, very probably, the most usual species of dream. And if so, it is 

 also likely that most dreams pass entirely from the memory. 



Such considerations may suggest some reflection on Mr. Locke's assertion, 

 that " the soul thinks not always." I should be far, indeed, from presuming to as- 

 sert the contrary: — but the reason given, "for this wants proofs," is a manifest fal- 

 lacy. The want of proofs is a good reason for abstaining from positive affirmation; 

 but, considering the preceding statement, it may be applied also in an opposite 

 direction, — for it appears that the soul may possibly think so as to leave no 

 proof. The thing is improbable; but the accident which recalls a dream, which 



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