172 Dr. WHEWELL, ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ANTITHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY. 



pressed in many other ways; but is not difficult, under all these different forms, to recognize the 

 same opposition : and the same remarks apply to it under its various forms, with corresponding 

 modifications. Thus, as we have already seen, the antithesis agrees with that of Reasoning and 

 Observation : again, it is identical with the opposition of Reflection and Sensation : again, sensation 

 deals with Objects; facts involve Objects, and generally all things without us are Objects: — 

 Objects of sensation, of observation. On the other hand, we ourselves who thus observe objects, 

 and in whom sensation is, may be called the Subjects of sensation and observation. And this 

 distinction of Subject and Object is one of the most general ways of expressing the fundamental 

 antithesis, although not yet perhaps quite familiar in English. I shall not scruple however to 

 speak of the Subjective and Objective element of this antithesis, where the expressions are con- 

 venient. 



8. All these forms of antithesis, and the familiar references to them which men make in all 

 discussions, shew the fundamental and necessary character of the antithesis. We can have no 

 knowledge without the union, no philosophy without the separation, of the two elements. We can 

 have no knowledge, except we have both impressions on our senses from the world without, and 

 thoughts from our minds within : — except we attend to things, and to our ideas ; — except we 

 are passive to receive impressions, and active to compare, combine, and mould them. But on the 

 other hand, philosophy seeks to distinguish the impressions of our senses from the thoughts of 



our minds ; to point out the difference of ideas and things ; — to separate the active from the 



passive faculties of our being. The two elements, sensations and ideas, are both requisite to the 

 existence of our knowledge, as both matter and form are requisite to the existence of a body. 

 But philosophy considers the matter and the form separately. The properties of the form are the 

 subject of geometry, the properties of the matter are the subject of chemistry or mechanics. 



9. But though philosophy considers these elements of knowledge separately, they cannot really 

 be separated, any more than can matter and form. AVe cannot exhibit matter without form, or 

 form without matter ; and just as little can we exhibit sensations without ideas, or ideas without 

 sensations ; — the passive or the active faculties of the mind detached from each other. 



In every act of my knowledge, there must be concerned the things whereof I know, and thoughts 

 of me who know : 1 must both passively receive or have received impressions, and I must actively 

 combine them and reason on them. No apprehension of tilings is purely ideal : no experience of 

 external things is purely sensational. If they be conceived as things, the mind must have been 

 awoke to the conviction of things by sensation : if they be conceived as things, the expressions of 

 the senses must have been bound together by conceptions. If we thi7ik of any thing, we must 

 recognize the existence both of thoughts and of things. The fundamental antithesis of philo- 

 sophy is an antithesis of inseparable elements. 



10. Not only cannot these elements be separately exhibited, but they cannot be separately con- 

 ceived and described. The description of them must always imply their relation ; and the names 

 by which they are denoted will consequently always bear a relative significance. And thus the 

 terms which denote the fundamental antithesis of philosophy cannot be applied absolutely and 

 exclusively in any case. We may illustrate this by a consideration of some of the common modes 

 of expressing the antithesis of which we speak. The terms Theory and Fact are often emphatically 

 used as opposed to each other : and they are rightly so used. But yet it is impossible to say 

 absolutely in any case. This is a Fact and not a Theory ; this is a Theory and not a Fact, 

 meaning by Theory, true Theory. Is it a fact or a theory that the stars appear to revolve round 

 the pole ? Is it a fact or a theory that the earth is a globe revolving round its axis ? Is it a 

 fact or a theory that the earth revolves round the sun ? Is it a fact or a theory that the sun 

 attracts the earth.' Is it a fact or a theory that a loadstone attracts a needle.' In all these 

 cases, some persons would answer one way and some persons another. A person who has never 



