174 Dr. WHEWELL, ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ANTITHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY. 



constantly at work. Observation begins before we can suppose the existence of any reasoning which 

 is not involved in observation. Hence, at whatever period we consider our ideas, we must consider 

 them as having been already engaged in connecting our sensations, and as modified by this employ- 

 ment. By being so employed, our ideas are unfolded and defined, and such development and 

 definition cannot be separated from the ideas themselves. We cannot conceive space without bound- 

 aries or forms ; now forms involve sensations. We cannot conceive time without events which mark 

 the course of time ; but events involve sensations. We cannot conceive number without conceiving 

 things which are numbered ; and things imply sensations. And the forms, things, events, which are 

 thus implied in our ideas, having been the objects of sensation constantly in every part of our life, 

 have modified, unfolded and fixed our ideas, to an extent which we cannot estimate, but which we 

 must suppose to be essential to the processes which at present go on in our minds. We cannot say 

 that objects create ideas ; for to perceive objects we must already have ideas. But we may say, 

 that objects and the constant perception of objects have so far modified our ideas, that we cannot, 

 even in thought, separate our ideas from the perception of objects. 



AVe cannot say of any ideas, as of the idea of space, or time, or number, that they are absolutely 

 and exclusively ideas. We cannot conceive what space, or time, or number would be in our minds, 

 if we bad never perceived any thing or things in space or time. AVe cannot conceive ourselves 

 in such a condition as never to have perceived any thing or things in space or time. But, on the other 

 hand, just as little can we conceive ourselves becoming acquainted with space and time or numbers 

 as objects of sensation. We cannot reason without having the operations of our minds affected by 

 previous sensations ; but we cannot conceive reasoning to be merely a series of sensations. In order 

 to be used in reasoning, sensation must become observation ; and, as we have seen, observation 

 already involves reasoning. In order to be connected by our ideas, sensations must be things or 

 objects, and things or objects already include ideas. And thus, as we have said, none of the terms 

 by which the fundamental antithesis is expressed can be absolutely and exclusively applied. 



13. I now proceed to make one or two remarks suggested by the views which have thus 

 been presented. And first I remarif, that since, as we have just seen, none of the terms which 

 express the fundamental antithesis can be applied absolutely and exclusively, the absolute application 

 of the antithesis in any particular case can never be a conclusive or immoveable principle. This 

 remark is the more necessary to be borne in mind, as the terms of this antithesis are often used in a 

 vehement and peremptory manner. Thus we are often told that such a thing is a Fact and not a 

 Theory, with all the emphasis which, in speaking or writing, tone or italics or capitals can give. 

 We see from what has been said, that when this is urged, before we can estimate the truth, or the 

 value of the assertion, we must ask to whom is it a fact .'' what habits of thought, what previous 

 information, what ideas does it imply, to conceive the fact as a fact ? Does not the apprehension of 

 the fact imply assumptions which may with equal justice be called theory, and which are perhaps false 

 theory ? in which case, the fact is no fact. Did not the ancients assert it as a fact, that the earth 

 stood still, and the stars moved.'' and can any fact have stronger apparent evidence to justify per- 

 sons in asserting it emphatically than this had ? These remarks are by no means urged in order to 

 shew that no fact can be certainly known to be true ; but only to shew that no fact can be certainly 

 shown to be a fact merely by calling it a fact, however emphatically. There is by no means any 

 ground of general skepticism with regard to truth involved in the doctrine of the necessary com- 

 bination of two elements in all our knowledge. On the contrary, ideas are requisite to the essence, 

 and things to the reality of our knowledge in every case. The proportions of geometry and arith- 

 metic are examples of knowledge respecting our ideas of space and number, with regard to which 

 there is no room for doubt. The doctrines of astronomy are examples of truths not less certain 

 respecting the external world. 



li. I remark further, that since in every act of knowledge, observation or perception, both the 

 elements of tlie fundamental antithesis are involved, and involved in a manner inseparable even 



