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Mk. ELLIS, ON THE THEORY OF MATTER. 



of Boscovich's theory*. To Boscovich appears to belong the credit of having perceived that 

 if the atoms were conceived of simply as unextended centres of force the primary qualities of 

 bodies might sufficiently be accounted for without supposing them to result from the primary 

 qualities of their constituent atoms — a mode of explanation of which, though there has been 

 something like a return to it in some recent speculations, it may be observed that it explains 

 nothing. Boscovich's theory seems to have been so completely in accordance with the direction 

 in which mathematical physics have of late been moving, that it was adopted as it were uncon- 

 sciously — almost all modern investigations on subjects connected with molecular action are in 

 effect based on his views, though his name is, comparatively speaking, but seldom mentioned. 

 And this theory, (whether or not the hypothesis of the existence of discrete centres of action 

 be or be not essential to it, a question connected with that which in former times caused so much 

 perplexity, namely, the nature of continuity, and which it is not necessary to my present purpose 

 to consider), is in truth the highest developement which the mathematical theory of matter has as 

 yet received — it is that on which the pretensions of mathematical physicists to vindicate for 

 their own methods the right, so to speak, if not the power, to explain all phenomena mainly 

 depend. Adopting for the sake of definite conception the received form of this theory, that namely in 

 which the centres of force are discrete and at insensible distances from each other, I now shall 

 attempt to show what ulterior developements it admits of, and how by means of these the 

 error noticed at the close of the last Section, namely, the confounding the admission that all 

 phenomena are to be explained cinematically with the assertion that they can all be explained 

 mechanically may be met, and, as it seems to me, sufficiently refuted. 



9. I begin by observing that though we speak and shall continue to do so of the action of 

 matter on matter, yet that no part of the views I am about to state depends on the hypothesis we 

 adopt touching the nature of causation. They would remain unchanged whether we accept a 

 theory of pre-established harmony, or one of physical influence, or whether we abstain from all 

 theories on the subject. This being understood, we may, I think, lay down the axiom that 

 whatever property we ascribe to matter, we may also ascribe to it, the property of producing in 

 other portions of matter the former property. Of this axiom the present state of Boscovich's 

 theory affords a familiar illustration. Every portion of matter is locally moveable, therefore we 

 may ascribe to any portion of matter the power of producing motion in any other, hereby giving 

 rise to the whole doctrine of attractive and repulsive forces. At this point we have hitherto 

 stopped, but for no satisfactory reason. We may proceed farther, and we are therefore bound, 

 in constructing the most general possible hypothesis, to do so : we may ascribe to each portion of 

 matter the power of engendering in any other that which we call force, in other words the power 

 of producing the power of actuating the potential mobility of matter. It is not a priori at all 

 more easy to conceive that A should have the power of setting B in motion, or of changing the 

 velocity it already has, than that C should have the power of enabling J to act on B, or of 

 changing the mode of action which A already possesses. And let it be observed, that the new 

 power thus ascribed to C is as distinct from force, as force is from velocity. The two are related 

 as cause and effect, but formally are wholly independent. Now unless this hypothetically possible 

 mode of action can be shown to have no existence in rerum natura, it is clear that the inference 

 from the conclusion that no phenomenon can be imagined not resoluble en derniere analyse, into 

 local motion to the assertion that mechanical force is the only agency to be recognised in the 



* It is, I believe, known that Boscovich^s fundamental idea 

 was deduced by a not unnatural filiation from the monadism of 

 Leibnitz. Yet the scope and limits which he proposed to himself 

 difter e-isentially from those of the German philosopher, inasmuch 

 as they are essentially physical. Moreover, the latter would have 



objected on the principle of sufficient reason to the want of any 

 thing to individuate the atoms of Boscovich ; and, at least in the 

 latter years of his life, to the " Ferae M'irkung," on which the 

 whole theory depends. 



