68 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. [VoL. VIII 
of principles already established, the development by logical inference of 
rules laid down under certain circumstances and their adaptation to other 
circumstances as they arise, the evolution on a scientific basis of legal rela- 
tions as modified by the ever-changing exigencies of society? How could 
such evolution be hindered by a code? Would it not rather be facilitated, 
if the rules of law were clearly and succinctly stated, so as to be easily 
referred to, rather than to be laboriously sought for in the constantly in- 
creasing volumes of law reports? The ideal code would render unneces- 
sary any reference to the reports of cases determined prior to the date of its 
coming into force, but of course, law reporting would not be done away with. 
Periodically the results of judicial decisions, as well as of statutory enact- 
ments, would have to be incorporated in the code, and a new start made; 
for finality in legislation, whether judiciary or statutory, is impossible. 
Nature is so multifarious that we cannot imagine a time when science will 
have unravelled all its secrets; no more can we imagine a time when human 
nature will have reached such a development that legal progress will be un- 
necessary. No code can ever be perfect, but we may hope that a scientific 
codification of English law will sooner or later be an accomplished fact. 
When accomplished, it will be one of the greatest achievements of the hnman 
intellect. 
There are many irregularities and imperfections in English law which 
an honest application of the principles of science will to a very great extent, 
if not wholly, remedy. In no direction will this be more marked than in 
the fixing of the punishments for crimes. It will be remembered that 
Blackstone, after giving his definition of a law as a rule of civil conduct 
prescribed by the supreme power in a state commanding what is right and 
prohibiting what is wrong, and analysing the various parts of this definition, 
goes on to speak of the sanction or vindicatory branch of the law, whereby it 
is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as commit any 
public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty. | The law does not 
reward the law-abiding citizen; it only punishes the law-breaker. The 
object of punishment is frequently stated to be the reformation of the 
offender, but although that may very properly be one object of punishment, 
I think the prime object of punishment is the protection of society. The 
forgetting of this is the origin of much of the mawkish sentimentality of 
some good people in reference to this subject. The man who commits 
crime proclaims himself an enemy to society, and the safety of society de- 
mands that he should be withdrawn from society permanently, or at least 
until he shows by his conduct plainly and unmistakably that he has reform- 
ed and may safely be discharged from prison. The law acts on this principle 
when it prescribes capital punishment for the murderer, or perpetual im- 
prisonment; but in the elaborate series of punishments prescribed for lesser 
crimes, the principle is lost sight of, and vengeance on the criminal seems 
