316 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. [Vou. VIII. 
laws according to which we order our perceptions definitely and unam- 
biguously in space. 
The first problem in so far as it refers to the question of the objectivity 
or subjectivity of space must since Kant’s Critiques be regarded as settled. 
We can not know anything of an objective space. Though there are no 
limits to our beliefs, (if only we avoid contradiction) there is not much 
sense in saying we believe there exists an objective space, for what is 
existence if it is not a certain complex of space relations? Just here it 
may be worth while to examine briefly our idea of existence. Gener- 
ally we have two ways of spgaking of existence or reality. That which 
is real or exists is either that which takes part in consciousness or that 
which has certain space and time relations. If existence or reality means 
the former, then everything which is in my consciousness must _be real, 
even the products of my imagination, for they exist as constituent parts 
of my consciousness. In this case everything is real except the products 
of human lie. If on the other hand, existence or reality means a certain 
complex of space (and time) relations (involving especially continuity) 
reality and existence are confined to certain facts and are denied to others. 
In this sense people say, for instance, that direct impressions are real, and 
that the products of imagination, the images of memory, are unreal. The - 
objection will be raised that there might be a third meaning to the term 
existence. If so, please let us know what it is; we claim that all 
definitions of existence if they are not a vicious circle, come to one of the 
above two or a combination of them. That is especially so with the 
reality or existence of the ‘‘things’’ or external objects; for ‘‘things”’ con- 
sist of a complication of direct impressions and memory images or imagin- 
ations. Naive realism and often the physical sciences regard the reality 
of the things, the cbjects, as of a higher order than that of the states of 
consciousness, which, it is alleged, might be illusory. They attribute, so 
to say, to the object, that is to the thing behind the phenomenon, a re- 
ality more ‘‘real’’ than the reality of the directly given facts. Even 
in modern times there is a school of philosophers which, in spite of the 
convincing arguments of Kant, Wundt, Mach, and others on this subject, 
still insist on seeking a real but hidden reality (Realitat) behind the 
deceptive given reality (Wirklichkeit). I must beg to be excused for 
stating the fundamental proposition of these philosophers in the above 
obviously illogical terms. It. cannot be done otherwise, except 
in taking refuge in words of different languages, which originally stood 
for the same conception but for which you then stipulate an imaginary 
difference in meaning. ‘Thus, for instance, we have in Germany the new 
‘“Realitats versus Wirklichkeitsphilosophie,”’ though it takes a good 
amount of juggling and tight-rope walking, on the stage of philosophy, to 
