326 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. [Vor VIII. 
ing) is an ultimate conception not further analyzable, and secondly,— 
that there are other magnitudes than intensities: With regard to the 
first assumption we might ask,—could there be a single magnitude alone? 
Obviously not, for only by comparison, by relation to others, does some- 
thing become a magnitude. Comparison is by no means a simple process. 
The act of comparison always presupposes that of distinction. By dis- 
tinction is not meant the quantitative ascertaining or determination of a 
difference,—for that would be comparison—but the experience: this is not 
that, itis another. ‘Two simple or complex states of consciousness can only 
be compared, if there has been distinction first. If two states of con- 
sciousness would show no difference at all, they would be identical, i. e. 
—they would not be two states of consciousness but only one. Distinction 
refers rather to the quality, (as with simultaneously perceived tones or 
noises, and also with complications of impressions of different senses) 
or to space, (as for instance in the distinction of simultaneous but other- 
wise perfectly equal impressions i.e., so called numerical difference) or 
finally to quality and space at the same time (as in the distinction of colours). 
Intensities we can only distinguish if they are separated in space or time, 
or ate qualitatively different, and the distinction in time must in the last 
instance also depend on space. A purely temporal series of different 
intensities is only possible if the reproduced idea, (memory image) of the 
preceding impression is either qualitatively different from the present 
one, or is represented (in the memory image) as spacially beside the latter. 
If one single sensation would fill the whole consciousness, we would not 
be able to perceive a change in its intensity, for the distinction would 
presuppose that the two intensities, (the one as a memory image) would 
be at one time together in consciousness. Grassman* thinks that the 
conception of the continuous change of an element could only apply to 
extensive magnitudes. We could not agree to that, for a continuous 
change can just as well be observed in intensive as in extensive magnitudes, 
but in both only by virtue of relations to other impressions. If the mind 
was filled with one intensive magnitude, and had nothing for comparison, 
neither a continuous nor any other change of the magnitude could ever 
be noticed. 
Comparison refers to the degree of difference. The fundamental 
judgment here reads: this is greater, more, or smaller, less than that, or 
this is equal to that (in quantity only) though it must be different in space 
relation, etc. Thus comparison concerns the degree of magnitude or in 
case of qualitative difference the degree of similarity. Now we claim that 
whilst distinction always refers to qualitative or space differences, com- 
parison, which pre-supposes distinction is always a matter of intensity, 
*Die Lineare Ausdehnungslehre, page 28. Edited by Friedr Engel. 
