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times of civil commotion, cfuring revolutions, or after lliem, before a 

 new order of things has been fairly accepted and acquiesced in by 

 society. In such t;mes the common law of peace is too Aveak for the 

 emergency. We are accustomed to see martial law substituted in its 

 place, or in other ways the hands of the established government 

 strengthened for the speedy oppression of resistance and even of discon- 

 tent. The cases of hardship or injustice, inevitably arising from such 

 cii'cumstances, were increased among the Romans from the peculiar 

 nature of their judicial procedure, which even in common criminal 

 cases allowed too much of political agitation and party influence. 



If the law of treason had been perfect among the Eomans during 

 the time of the healthy republic, we could hardly expect to see it 

 emerge in a perfect state from the long-continued civil wars. But 

 it was most defective from the beginning in one essential point. The 

 definition of high treason was extremely vague, so that it could be 

 turned and twisted to suit the convenience of any dominant party. 

 High treason,' or as the Romans called it, Imminuta Majestas, 

 included every offence against the sovereignty, and safety of the 

 commonwealth. One of the chief objects of the Lex Majestatis was 

 the protection of the public oflBcers in the execution of their duty, and 

 it appears probable, that the first law of this kind, the Lex Appuleia, 

 (about 1 00 B.C.) was principally intended to give increased secmity to 

 the tribunes of the people."^ The Emperoi"s found this law admirably 

 adapted to secure their usurpation. They represented in their own 

 person the sovereignty of the Roman people, and besides other 

 functions they had aiTogated to themselves the Tribunitia Potestas for 

 life, which gave them the sacred inviolability of the ancient tribunes. 



It may well be doubted, if this ari'augement, so ingeniously contrived 

 by Augustus, was superfluous in the yet unsettled state of the Roman 

 monarchy. Next to the exhaustion of the people, and their readiness 

 to obey a master, it was the greatest security of the new sovereigns. 

 The early Emperors, though commanding large armies in the 

 remote provinces, had but a very small body of troops immediately 

 under their hands at Rome. It might have been impracticable to 

 resist a conspiracy after it had come to maturity. Therefore, it was 

 necessary to crush resistance in the bud, and it is not necessaiy to add, 

 that there was a gi'eat temptation, as there always is, for those, who had 

 the upper hand for the time, to crush and annihilate their opponents, 

 60 as to remove all danger and even the possibility of it for ever. 



"• At first the tribunes were only protected by the Sacratio of those who injured them. 

 The efficacy of this law was gone with the general influence of superslilion. Heucc ths 

 desire to obtain more tfiectuPl protection, 



