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settle the differences which must necessarily result from 

 the wonderful activity of that intercourse. Treaties for 

 special purposes, congresses for the settlement of occa- 

 sional disputes must give way to general laws and some 

 permanent authority. What has been accomplished to a 

 certain extent by the several systems of confederation 

 among different branches of the Teutonic stock, must be 

 perfected and extended all over the world. 



The greatest difficulty lies in the inequality of the 

 different states. It would be absurd to organize a federal 

 authority in which a powerful state like England, or 

 Russia, should have no more influence than Sweden, or 

 Belgium. A certain scale must be fixed upon analagous 

 to the real strength of each state. England, France, 

 Russia, Austria, and America, might rank equally high ; 

 states like Prussia and Tiirkey in the second line ; Spain, 

 Sweden, Naples, Sardinia, in the third, and so on ; and 

 the number of votes of each state should be regulated so 

 as to ensure an equitable balance of influence. Mathe- 

 matical precision is unattainable, but a workable approx- 

 imation to the real nature of things may be hoped for. 



A permanent court, composed of ambassadors of all 

 states who voluntarily join such a confederation should 

 regulate all international relations, subject, in the last 

 instance, to the consent of the legislature of each state. 



In cases of differences or dispute, the court should 

 give its decision on the question of right. The moral 

 force would be great, and in all but extreme cases 

 sufficient to ensure compliance. The appeal to force 

 would become less and less frequent ; and though it 

 would perhaps be impossible to organize an international 

 executive, the confederated powers would stand pledged 

 to see the decision of the court carried out. 



The effect would not be the immediate abolition of all 

 wars, but a prevention of the frequent collisions and 



