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into motion towards something {vpoa-cpSpa), which he calls Appetite,* and 

 motion from {aTro(p6pa), which he calls Aversion. Appetite he also calls 

 Desire, or IiOve,t and aversion Hate ; and " those things which we 

 neither desire nor hate, we are said to coutemue, Contempt being 

 nothing else but an immobility." In order to establish the reign of 

 Motion, under the forms of Appetite or motion to, Aversion or motion 

 from, and Contempt, or freedom from all motion, Hobbes next 

 proceeds to deny the existence of any absolute good or evil. " What- 

 soever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is what he, 

 for his part, calleth good ; and the object of his hate and aversion, 

 evil. For these words, good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used 

 with relation to the person that useth them ; there being nothing 

 simply or absolutely so, nor any common rule of good or evil to he taken 

 from the ohjecis themselves, but from the person of the man, where there 

 is no commonwealth, or in a commonwealth from the person that 

 representeth it." The sense of Appetite, or Aversion to or from an 

 object, Hobbes calls Delight or Trouble. Those delights which arise 

 from the sense of an object present he calls Pleasures of Sense ; — 

 those which arise from expectation of consequences, Joy. " In the 

 like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, and called Payne : 

 others in the expectation of consequences, and called Grief." And 

 then Hobbes proceeds to pack all human passions and feelings 

 into this theory of his, resolving them all into motion to or from, i.e. 

 into Ajypetite or Aversion, under the different forms of desire, love, and 

 joy, hate and grief.]; Even with the aid of his great petitio principii, 

 it is curious to see what manifold turnings and windings he has to 

 make — what violence he is obliged to put upon the plain meaning of 

 common words, in order to prevent them giving the lie to his system. 

 Hope he defines to be " appetite, with opinion of attaining ;" Kindness, 

 "love of persons, society;" Admiration, "joy from apprehension of 

 novelty ;" " sudden glory is the passion which maketh those grimaces 

 called laughter. "§ Thus love, reverence, admiration, kindness and 

 hope, are all referred to Appetite, i.e. to Motion. Again, " Aversion, 



• It is a curious instance of Hobbes's ncuteiiess, that the meaning which he gives to the 

 word peto, is precisely that attributed to it by modern philologists. — Sco Key's Latin 

 Orammar, p. .'51]. 



+ " Desire and lovo," he says, " are the same thing." 



t " These simple piissions called appetite and desire, lovo, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, 

 liave their names for divers considerations diversified." 



§ In the " Human Nature," his deiinition of laughter is " A sudden glory arising from a 

 sudden conception of some nminency in ourselves, by comp.irison with the inflrmity of 

 others, or with our own family, for men laugh at the follies of themselves past." 



