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with hope of avoiding hurt by resistance, is Courage.'" " Sudden 

 coui'age, Anger." " Contempt of little helps and hindrances, Magnani- 

 mity." " Aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, Feare." 

 " Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from 

 tales publiquely allowed, Eeligion ; not allowed. Superstition. And 

 when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, True Eeligion." 

 We may admire this ingenious reduction of Magnanimity to 

 Contempt, and Religion to Aversion, which if it be " truly 

 such" is " true," and compare what follows with his preceding 

 definitions of "glory" and "laughter." "Grief from opinion of 

 want of power is called Dejection ;" " sudden dejection is the 

 passion that causeth weeping, and is caused by such accidents 

 as suddenly take away some vehement hope." " Therefore some 

 weep for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge hij 

 reconciliation;"^- " Grief for the discovery of some defect of 

 ability is Shame ;" the " contempt of good reputation is called 

 Impudence;" "grief for the calamity of another is called Pity, and 

 ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall 

 himself ; and therefore is also called Compassion, and, in the 

 phrase of this present time, a Fellow-feeling." " Grief for the 

 success of a competitor is Emulation." Having thus reduced re- 

 ligion, courage, emulation, sorrow, shame, and compassion, to Aversion, 

 i.e. also to motion, Hobbes goes on in the next chapter to lower 

 Conscience and Faith. " When two or more know of one and the same 

 fact, they are said to be conscious of it, which is as much as to know it 



• The definitions given here are deliberately revised and repeated from his work on " Human 

 Nature." There he says of Reconciliation, " Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, 

 when the revenge is su<ldenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary ; 

 and such are the ieurs uf reconciliation." 



In his " Human Nature," he says, that in beholding the danger of a ship in a tempest, 

 though there is pity which is grief, yet " the delight in our own security is so far predomi- 

 nant, that men are usually content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of tlieir 

 friends;" and again, speaking of" a passion, sometimes called love, but more properly good, 

 will, or charity," he says, " The affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits 

 on strangers is not to be called charity, but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase 

 friendship, or fear, which makes them to purchase peace." Perhaps the best refutation of 

 this preposterous attempt to reduce all our feelings and actions to the desire of power is to 

 be found in Bishop Butler's First Sermon on Human Nature, where he remarks, " Is there 

 not often the appearance of a man's wishing that good to niioiher which he knows himself 

 unable to procure him ; and rejoicing in it when bestowed by a third person? And can 

 love of power any-way possibly come into account for this desire or delight ? Is there not 

 often the appearance of men's distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one 

 before the other to do good to, where love of power cannot in the least account for the 

 distinction and preference." All three sermons, as well as the very able prelace to them, 

 are directed against Hobbes. 



