86 



acknowledge that a justifiable solicitude for the safety not only of the 

 Rhenish legions but also of the Rhenish frontier, for the reputation of 

 the Roman arms, and for the resources of the empire, compelled Tiberius 

 to put a stop to expeditions which led to no new acquisition of terri- 

 tory, but wasted the best blood of the Roman legions in inglorious com- 

 bats with half-armed barbarians, and could scarcely be redeemed from 

 the dangerous whispers of the capital by triumphant shows and falsified 

 reports of successes and victories. 



Chaptee III. 

 It was the dying wish of Augustus that the Rhine should remain the 

 frontier line of the empire in the north-west. This desire was not the 

 result of generosity or satisfied ambition, nor did it flow from the 

 impression that Germany was a country not worth the honour of 

 a Roman province. On the contrary, the attempt had been made to 

 establish Roman rule permanently on the east of the Rhine, and it had 

 failed so signally that the terrors of the Cimbric invasion were for a 

 time renewed throughout Italy. We can hardly doubt that the cautious 

 and peaceful Tiberius fully adopted the view of Augustus with respect 

 to the Rhenish frontier, and it must have been no slight concession to 

 the ardent S2:)irit of the young Germanicus when the Emperor gave his 

 consent to the renewal of hostilities which had hitherto proved so 

 costly and fruitless. 



The history of these campaigns has been described by Romans alone. 

 If we had the national songs, in which, according to Tacitus, the Germans 

 celebrated the exploits of their heroes, we should, no doubt, have a some- 

 what different version of the war between Germanicus and Arminius ; 

 but even in the one-sided reports of the Roman writers we see hardly 

 anything but a long series of great efforts followed by failures and 

 reverses, and ending in retreat and loss. 



The first exploit of Germanicus was a sudden invasion into the land of 

 the Marsi, whom he surprised during the night after a festival, when 

 they had no suspicion of war. A horrid carnage inaugurated the recom- 

 mencement of hostilities, in which, as Tacitus relates with cold blooded 

 naivete, neither age nor sex was spared, the unresisting enemies 

 were cut down in their sleep, and the country for fifty miles was laid 

 waste with fire and sword. The effect of such a massacre was to rouse 

 the German tribes, and ^to inflame their patriotism with the fiercest 

 spirit of revenge. They occupied the line of retreat of their enemies. 

 Tacitus (An. I. 51) admits that the Roman light cohorts were thrown 

 into confusion, but the heavy armed legions repelled the enemies and 

 the army reached the Rhine in safety. 



