32 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. 
So much for the Legislative power. The judicial power is totally 
different from what obtains in England. In the main—except as to 
certain powers of the Supreme Court at Washington it is analogous. 
to the judicial power in the United States. A judge in England 
cannot ignore a statute so long as it is on the books. It binds him— 
he may evade it or misinterpret it, but before the Constitution he has. 
no power to query it. Such is not the case here or in the United 
States. 
With us, as with them, the Constitution is the basis of legislative 
authority ; it lies at the foundation of all law, and is a rule and 
commission by which both legislators and judges are to proceed. If 
the legislatures transgress their constitutional bounds the courts must 
correct them. But the judiciary has no control over legislature, and 
no power whatever to question its purpose or animus so long as such 
legislation is kept within its defined limits. The judiciary is, there- 
fore, not a subordinate but a co-ordinate branch of the government 
of this country. It may keep the executive even within its authority 
by refusing to give the sanction of law to whatever it may do beyond 
it, and by holding the agents and instruments of its unlawful action 
to strict accountability. 
A judge in a Division Court, as well as a judge in the Supreme 
Court, may be bound to ignore a statute, if not passed by the proper 
Legislature or Parliament. Every act of any of our legislatures 
repugnant to the Constitution is absolutely void, and cannot become 
law of the land. There is a presumption in favour of its validity, 
however, until the contrary is established. 
The executive power in Canada is peculiar and merits a remark. 
Whilst the legislative powers of the Provinces and the Dominion are 
sharply defined, and whilst the judicial or administrative powers are 
little capable of creating a difference of opinion, it is impossible to 
say that the Act of 1867 is “not conflicting,” or at least embarrassing 
in respect of the executive. In the British Constitution the sovereign 
is the apex of authority ; the King or Queen theoretically summons 
the Parliament, which makes or is responsible for all the laws in the 
realm—appoints the judges who administer these laws, and the execu- 
tive authority is vested in her. The same Queen in Canada is the 
same power, and summons the Parliament at Ottawa, appoints the 
judges as a general rule, with one trifling exception, and the executive 
government and authority of and over Canada is vestedin her. This, 
