238 On Cell Life. [| April, 
matter in the network of causes. Those who view the world from 
a materialistic aspect assume the right to deny that the things © 
which are yet beyond our experience possess in themselves an 
existence as subjects. I will stop no longer to criticize this view of 
the world, nor will I further delay the continuation of my 
observations. I hope, also, without having placed the matter in the 
position of a certainty, that the reader will at least allow that an 
organic cell has a true subjective existence. One cannot with 
certainty prove the truth of this hypothesis; and indeed, at pre- 
sent, it must remain a supposition, because the inner being of the 
thing itself is not open to our experience. In the same manner, 
we cannot certainly prove the animation of another man. In point 
of fact, as a mere matter of experience, a man is nothing more than 
one of the numerous phenomena of our objective experience; that 
is to say, a something from which material influence on other 
matter proceeds, and which is obedient to the great network of 
causes. Nevertheless, it has not yet occurred to any reasonable 
man to deny the animation of another. 
But what is it that makes us acknowledge the animation of 
another man, seemg that there is no direct experience about it? It 
is the following conclusion, derived from analogy, which makes us 
certain of it. ‘The individual Self is not only subjective, but as a 
corporeal phenomenon it is also objective with regard to the sensitive 
perceptions. We see our hands and feet, we hear our own voice, 
and distinguish it from that of another person’s ; as also we see the 
limbs of other men, hear their voices, and so on. In the range of 
our experience, we find the deportment of another man exactly like 
the deportment of our own body, as far as it is objective to us ; 
and hereon we found the certainly just analogical argument, 
“ Because I and another man exhibit exactly the same deportment 
objectively, so do we agree sulyectively; and because 1 inwardly 
know myself to be an animated being, so the other man also will 
be a similarly animated being.” 
Only once let us tread this path of analogy, and we shall find, as 
will be seen, that we can find no conclusion to the range of life but 
in the simplest cells. In fact, that one cannot stop at man is clear 
enough, and generally acknowledged. The higher animals, and 
especially those nearly related to us, are so much like us that it 
would be foolish to deny their animation. No one would be surprised 
at our ascribing animation, or understanding, or even reflection, to 
a dog or an ape; but if we descend lower in the catalogue of animals, 
the signs of mental or spiritual life become naturally less and ‘less 
visible, yet the degradation is so gradual, that we are unable to stop 
at any point in the list, and say, “ Here animation ceases and the 
simple machine begins.” 
[f we once ascribe animation to an ape, we must allow a polyp 
