372 Notices of Books. (July, 
than as does the man of Science pur sang. His interest lies, 
after all, in persons rather than in things, physical facts serving 
him mainly as an introduction to metaphysical reflection. He 
contemplates rather than speculates. His mind ever reverts to 
Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius. A striking instance of this tendency 
may be found in the outset of his Essay entitled ‘“ Plurality of 
Worlds: Are Other Planets Inhabited ?” He here informs us 
that ‘* Neither in the Old or New Testament do we find a distinct 
answer to the question, though perhaps a few inferential allusions 
to it. The same may be said of the classical writers: Plato, 
Aristotle, Lucretius, and Seneca, as far as I can recollect, are 
silent on the subject. Pliny, who grasps at everything known or 
imagined, is equally so.” This seems to us an instance of what 
Whewell calls the ‘‘ commentatorial spirit,’ so prominent in the 
Middle Ages, which, instead of enquiring into things themselves, 
asked rather what former authors had said on the subject. 
The most valuable of the Essays before us are, as might be 
expected, those bearing upon organic nature, especially “ Life 
on the Earth: Relations of Manto Other Animals.” Sir Henry 
here very justly pronounces Bichat’s well-known definition of 
life, ‘‘ La vie est l'ensemble des fonctions qui résistent a la mort,” 
and that of the ‘‘ Encyclopédie,” ‘‘ La vie est le contraire de la 
mort,” as “too epigrammatically negative to serve any use.” 
He might have gone further, and pronounced Bichat’s utterance 
one of the greatest absurdities ever uttered by a man of mark. 
‘«‘ Life is the sum of the functions which resist death.” But what 
is ‘‘death’’? The termination of life. If we, then, insert this 
explanation in Bichat’s definition in place of its equivalent 
“death,” we read— Life is the sum of the functions by which 
the termination of life is resisted,’ which is nonsense. Sir H. 
Holland well points out that these definitions sin by omitting 
«‘that which is the very essence of life, viz., that of reproducing 
life more or less like in kind to itself.” But is the search for 
such definitions scientific ? We may ascertain the properties of 
life, as we do those of electricity or of gravitation. But can we 
possibly ascertain the essence of any of the three? 
We are happy to find that the author has no sympathy with 
that purblind egotism which would represent man as differing 
from the lower animals not in degree, but in kind. ‘‘ The philo- 
sopher,” he writes, ‘‘looking on the dog crouched at his feet, 
sees in him an animal with organisation akin to his own; with 
intelligence, memory, feelings, and passions of the same kind, 
however different in degree and in manner of use ; with appetites 
and necessities of life similar, also, though more in subordination 
to instincts and hereditary habits of the species. The idle spec- 
tator gazes on the anthropoid ape with mere merriment at this 
mockery of human form and gesture. The man of deeper 
thought cannot stand in face of these creatures without some 
feeling of awe in the contemplation of that mysterious scheme 
