1875.] Animal Depravity. 429 
There are several other authenticated cases on record | 
where dogs have committed suicide by drowning. It is im- 
portant, as showing intention, that dogs are perfectly aware 
of the results of prolonged immersion in water, as evinced 
by their so frequently rescuing children when in danger of 
drowning. Were dead brutes honoured with a searching 
investigation, we might perhaps find such instances far 
more frequent than we suspect. They have, however, scan- 
tier facilities for self-murder than man, and possibly slighter 
temptations, as being doubtless, upon the whole, less miser- 
able. 
The various actions above mentioned are all departures 
from the normal or natural conduét of the species concerned, 
and of course lead us again to the conclusion that brutes 
can do wrong, and if wrong, that they are consequently able 
also to do right. 
Perhaps it may be argued by the captious that though 
gluttony, neglect of offspring, suicide, and the like, are 
wrong in themselves, and are hurtful to the offending ani- 
mal and its species, yet that brutes have no conscience, and 
neither feel any satisfaction in “‘ obeying the laws” of their 
nature nor any remorse upon transgression. To this we 
may in the first place reply with a tw quoque—a retort for 
once satisfactory, as it withdraws the pretended distin¢tion. 
Man does not appear to have any inborn and _ infallible 
knowledge of right and wrong. His vaunted conscience, 
when it is more than a mere figure of speech, is a creature 
of conventions and traditions. There is no vice, no crime 
even, how horrible soever, which at some time or in some 
part of the world man has not practised without a shadow 
of self-reproach. He has suffered, indeed, from his errors, 
but no more than the brutes does he, generally speaking, 
trace his sufferings to their true causes. Sir J. Lubbock 
states in his ‘‘ Origin of Civilization” that after inspecting 
nearly all existing records of savage life, he was unable to 
find any case of a savage having evinced remorse after the 
commission of any crime. 
But, on the other hand, does man really know that brutes 
are void of all trace of conscience—that they feel no joy 
when they have acted aright, and no sorrow when they have 
done amiss? He has no proof—merely wanton assumption. 
Facts prove that certain animals do feel shame, sorrow, or 
remorse, when they have departed from what to them is the 
standard of right; and what more can reasonably or fairly 
be demanded ? 
We have thus, we submit, established that the lower 
