184 THE BIRD WATCHER 
reared, all the while thaggit was rearing the foundling, 
to keep the two distinct, and remember not only that 
it had finished with its own chick, and seen it leave 
or gone off with it from the ledge, but also that 
it had not had another one since then. But though 
I believe that mental association may call up a very 
clear image of some past event in a bird’s mind, 
I cannot credit it with such retentiveness and per- 
spicuity of memory as this. Moreover, what idea of 
ownership in a chick cana bird have, other than those 
feelings which compel it to rear it? When once they 
are roused, the chick before it is its own. 
But has not this a bearing upon the nature and 
origin of sympathy? When we sympathise with 
others we, by a quick mental process, put ourselves 
in their place, and feel to a lesser degree in ourselves 
what we suppose them to be feeling. In a certain 
degree, therefore, we are them, but our reason assures 
us that this is not really the case. We can distinguish ; 
but can animals, or can they other than partially? 
Anthropologists have much to say—sometimes, per- 
haps, almost too much—on the extent to which 
savages mistake their subjective impressions for ob- 
jective reality ; but what applies to the savage should 
apply with much greater force to the animal. When 
a herd of fierce animals—as, say, of peccaries—are 
filled with sudden rage at the sight of a companion 
struck down by some beast of prey—bear, jaguar, or 
puma—and attack the assailant, is each member of it 
distinctly conscious that he is acting in defence of 
