A DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE. 105 



the facts which belong to them, is undoubtedly the 

 basis upon which this and all other sciences repose : 

 but if the zoologist or the botanist contents himself 

 with this information, — if he remains satisfied with 

 isolated descriptions drawn up in technical language, 



— and compiles a dictionary, under the name of a 

 system, of hard names, he has no more right to 

 term his pursuits intellectual, or to dignify them 

 with the name of science, than the astronomer would 

 have, under the circumstances just supposed. All 

 branches of natural science, however varied may 

 be their materials, or however diversified their 

 nature, have but one and the same object in view 



— the discovery of the primary laws of nature. In 

 comparison with this, all other objects, however 

 superior they may be in point of utility, yet, in 

 reference to sound philosophy, are of a secondary 

 or subordinate nature. As all sciences are based 

 upon facts, known, or to be known from experience, 

 so are they, in their early state of developement, 

 matters of pure observation. It is only when we 

 have acquired the power of generalising these facts, 

 when such generalisations agree among themselves 

 and with every thing we see or know of nature, 

 that the theory of a science becomes either abso- 

 lutely demonstrative, or approaches so near to cer- 

 tainty, by the force of analogical reasoning, that it 

 is not contradicted by any thing known. The case 

 of natural history, then, is precisely this ; in its early 

 stages it is a science of observation ; in its latter, it is 

 one of demonstration. There are few, indeed, even 

 among philosophers, who have the least suspicion 

 that natural history is deserving of this character. 



