292 STUDY OF NATURAL HISTORY. 



prevent such an ultimate coincidence of a fact of 

 nature and a scriptural truth, but the peculiar cir- 

 cumstances of the two systems to which they re- 

 spectively belong, it is evident that the two may 

 justly be conceived as ultimately coinciding in prin- 

 ciple, since they then appear as therefore only not 

 coincident actually? because their circumstances are 

 not. Hence it is, that the credibility derived to the 

 Scriptures from the coincidence of their doctrines 

 and circumstances with the facts of nature, is that 

 which belongs to the evidence of analogy. For by 

 analogical reasoning we are enabled to make the 

 requisite references to the circumstances by which 

 a general truth may be variously modified, and to 

 express the result of such references in our con- 

 clusion. When we argue by induction, the con- 

 clusion embraces all the circumstances belonging to 

 the facts upon which our observations have been 

 made. We reject and exclude all that are merely 

 accidental, but we rigidly preserve in the general 

 proposition every particular which appears really 

 to belong to the effect produced. Whenever, there- 

 fore, any circumstance really important is varied, 

 our former induction fails, and we must then either 

 repeat the experiment, or, if actual experiment be 

 impracticable, we must have recourse to analogical 

 reasoning; that is, to a mode of reasoning which 

 affirms the conclusion with such reserves, such alter- 

 ations, or exceptions, as may arise from any differ- 

 ence in the circumstances to which it is extended. 

 Without, indeed, such a relative adaptation to the 

 general truth as obtained by induction to the altered 

 circumstances of the case, the inference would be 



