\22 



On Mr. Loft's Cenfure oj the Inquirer. [Sept. I, 



idei which is not correfpontlent with any 

 exeinal niiterial thing, is not an iJea of 

 fc;n('ation. Tiie pinicular i'ei of bit- 

 ter quinquina wmld be, accoitimg to 

 Lockr, an id-.a of i'tn'ation ; Init ihe ge- 

 rerai idea of bii;eri;e!s, and the Itiil ni; re 

 geneinl idea of tilte, are, in Lccke'sdia- 

 lefl, ii)ea» of vcfleclion. T.he p'imnj-y 

 iniprefilors, which ofjeiis of leiili; make 

 while present, are by Locke called ideas 

 of ftnfation, and by hin luppoftd to be 

 fimjije ideas. Tiie i.condarycr t^lliary 

 jrnp cflions, whicli are revived in the mind 

 with more or Id's oin\ilion during thi; ;!b- 

 ftnce of ihofe ohjcfls of (cnl'e Irom whic'i 

 they were in tl^e hrit inflanci dcr ved, are 

 by Locke cnlleil ideas ot reflect in, and 

 by him fup.iofcd to be complex ideas. — 

 The pofition, or r.'.ther the obfervKtion, 

 of t'le Inquirer, amounts mertiy to this, 

 that the piiniary impvcffiois are complex, 

 and the revived iiiipuflijns lefs (o : Locke 

 making '.hat piocefs to be a ("ynthefis 

 which the Inquiier mainiains to be an 

 analylls. 



But Mr. LcfF', wlitn lie talks of the 

 idea of a tafle as a fi.nple idea, evidently 

 fupfiofes, anil fu; pofcs tir neoufly, that 

 Locke would have claifed it among Ideas 

 of fenfatj. 11, and not among ideas of re- 

 fleffion. He is f) accullonu-d to think in 

 the train of the Berkleysn* fthool, ac- 

 cording (o which, as according to the In- 

 quirer, abi'iTiel ideas .Tre the only fimple 

 idea.s, that he forgets his afiu ried part of 

 a vindicator of L ^cke, and, witiioot be- 

 ing a.vaie of it, aflnally vindicates the 

 Ir.q'iirer a ainll Lr-tke, " Although 

 (fays lie) In a rofe or iily the fvn'ations 

 derived fro:n one and the lhi,.tc fu'njeft be 

 very noiiierous, and piefern. thernlcives to 

 the min.l tof-jclher. they ate not the lefs 

 fimjleeach in icielf." This is exactly 

 what the Inciuirtr miin'ains, t'lar the im- 

 preffions of flrdaiion are r.umeious and 

 comjjiex ; and tha- they are lubl'cqueritJy 

 nnal\fed by luccefTive -nnd fei.arate partial 

 reminlfce; ces, and thus fimpHfied. Each 

 procc-fs of abftrattion o:ni:8 fame pt;r:ion 

 of the coirpound idea of i^iilation : the 

 highefl- degree of ablfrnft^on conhiis in 

 ilinplifying to perfti^ li;i".!ei cis On ob- 

 I'erving an external thing, iis iornis 



♦ " So f.nr I will not deny I can abftract, if 

 that may properly be calied abfiraclion which 

 exte'nds only to the conciving feparately 

 fiich ohjedls as it is poflible may really exift 

 ur be artually perceived afunder.'— Berke- 

 ley's Pririeiplcs of Human Knowledge, fsc. 

 V. In the thirteenth feflion unity ii admit- 

 ted to be a fimple idea aud an abiciAd idea. 



(EiJea) reach the mind, as rays of light 

 trie priiin, mingled, and fro:n many fenfes 

 ?t once. Tt-.e notices received through 

 the palite, through the ear, through the 

 eye, arc afterwards revived i'ep irately, 

 an't cof fidered apart ; as the red, yellow, 

 arid blue rays, which were combined in a 

 wdiite lijiit. Tne acidubtion of the cider, 

 the hilTing of the cider, tiie fparklirg of 

 the cider, act fimnltaneoufly on the fenfe j 

 to appreciate its racinefs, fermentation, or 

 traiifparency, feparately, is an effort of 

 abftraiSlion. 



I Mr. L'lfft next undertikes a defence of 

 the word ' refleftion.' Be it obferved, 

 that there •$ a inilprint in the i7tii line of 

 the ad column of page 219 (Monthly 

 Mag. vol. xix.), where ' reviewing' has 

 been put inilead ot ' revivinc;,' which 

 renders lefs clear the obje<5fion of the In- 

 quirer, who conceives that the word ' re- 

 fleftion' means a ' bending back,' or 

 * cafting bark ;' and that voKntary imi- 

 tations, in wl'.ich the forms (iiosa) of ex- 

 ternal things are thrown back on the ex- 

 ternal w: rid, are, ftiidily fpeaking, our 

 only " ails of refleftion." The word h-s 

 been diverted by Locke, and others, from 

 its origin:i!, etymological, and only une- 

 quivocal ligmficaiion, to defcribe arbitra- 

 rily I'ooie procefs of mind, which the fi- 

 quirer kiio .<s not hjw to define, and there- 

 fore knows not how to talk ahont. Bur, 

 acc^'rdingfo Mr LofFt, Locke has defined 

 it in file folliwing words : 



•' Kcfleiflion is explained to mean— -Hie 

 recolle^lcd perception of the fenfations oi" 

 operations of our own mind within iis." 



M.iik the (hameful imprecifion of thi« 

 definition ! 



1. Th; perception of a fenfition can- 

 not be " recolledled ;" becaufe fenfation 

 implies the prefence, and recoiled ion the 

 abi'ence, of the object of p-rception. 



2. The perception of lenfations, and 

 the perception of operatiens of mind, are 

 tautologiss'j becaule all fenftions imply 

 perception, . and bil ojieiations of mind 

 alio imoly perctpti. n. 



3j The woids " of our own mind" are 

 governed by boti'' HibMant ves " Ji?niations 

 nnd oper?Vi ns j" thus mind is made to 

 have fenlfii.ons, wiiich arc aUributes of 

 body only. 



4. In the combimtion " our own minJ," 

 the plura! pronuun being united with the 

 fingulsr f.iiilisntive, it is implied that or,e 

 and the fame mind may be common to 

 mare than ens individual : a doiJfrin'! not 

 inconfiftent wi;h the fpirjtiial pantheifm 

 of Berkeley, but quite inconfiilent with 

 the maieiiai indivicluility cf L.,cke. 



J. The 



