1805.] 



Mr. Lofft'i Reply to the Inquirer. 



299 



the other. But that there are fimple ideas 

 of abtiraflion the Inquirer affirms : that 

 there are fimple ideas of reiifation the In- 

 quirer no otlierwife denies than by faying 

 that we receive the inipi: (Tior.s together 

 from one and. the fame objeft which ex- 

 cites different fenfations, and that we 

 make th^fc fimple by abftfaftion. 



Bu; tlie exciting caufes bci' g fimulta- 

 neous, and from the fime obje51, no more 

 hinders the fim^licity of eacli paiticiikr 

 I'enfation, than a man llanding in an army 

 is lefs individually a man than if he Hood 

 aJone on Sahfbury Plain. In reality, an 

 abftiadl idea is formed bv a double opera- 

 tion of the mind : firft by analyfis, and 

 then by fynthefis. The mind an^lyfing 

 its feafations takes that <.<i fojt, fr in- 

 flance, a perception from the touch. — 

 Whatever produces this perctpton it calls 

 foft : and thus compounds itsabltrs(Sl idea 

 of fufaiefs a'crihable to all the various 

 caufes of this perception. And this being 

 one homogeneous idea, its occurring in a 

 variety ci fubjefls takes nothing Irom its 

 fimplicity any more than in the abftraft 

 idea of I'pace or time: as a thonfand uui- 

 fons in muiic form only the fimple idea of 

 that one iou..d or note. 



It is meie trifl.ng to fay that I compare 

 firnplicity when I lay that the idea of one 

 fimjik perception is as fimple as another. 

 This is not making degrees of fimplicity, 

 and cump^ring v as il it had a more or 

 lefs, but illuftiatingthe metaphyfical truth 

 that fimplicity has no degrees. 



In the pafljge which the Inquiier has 

 quoted, the very natuic of the p^ffage 

 fiiews that Locke has ulld the \\oi(.\ Jlmptr, 

 there in the general and pDpular fcnfe : 

 but when we Ipeak of fimplicity of ideas, 

 it admits anil requires it* liniSl; and pliili- 

 fophical itiiife. MaxiiDS, being nflcriive 

 propofitii.ns, however intuiiively true, 

 mud be neccffarily compound : and can 

 therefore ainir of no other than this in- 

 definite fimplicity. 



The Inquuerliay» that I confjund ideas 

 cf abllraftion with thole of fenf-ition : lie 

 i« miftaken. A bitter tafte means a bit- 

 ter lalie in particular, as of a fprig of 

 wormwood for inftance. Talie is an ab- 

 ftrad ; but the bitter tafte of a fprig of 

 wormwood, or any other bitter tafte in 

 particular, is the fame which expieftcs 

 that particular fenfation. S-ipp-Ze that I 

 am tafting woimwood at this moment, I 

 fcy this i ; a bitter ta !e, I exprcts the par. 

 ticular fenfation. I can afterwards apply 

 the term bititrnef» to a vatt variety of fub- 

 jeft« in which it occurs. 



The genetal idea of bitternefs is in 



Locke's dialedl and mine, and every rea- 

 fonable man'i, an abifraft idea, if he ac- 

 knov/ledges any. A bitter tafte, tliat is, 

 one particular ipfte which was excited by 

 a particular occafion, is not an abftradk 

 but n particulai idea. 



Locke does net luppofe all ideas of re- 

 fleflion to be complex. He funpofes and 

 inftances fimple ideas of reflcilion. He 

 has a title of them. 



The remark of the Inquiier, whofup-' 

 pofes the differ' nee to be, that Locke takes 

 all ideas of refleftion to be complex and 

 all ideas of fenfation fimple, and that the 

 reverfe is the truth, is therefore nelthei juit 

 as to Locke nor in iifclf. And yet pre. 

 fently alter the Inquirer will have it that 

 Locke and he fay exactly the Came thing 

 in the inftance from the rolt: and the lily, 

 when the truth is, that Locke fays, th t 

 .'cnfations are not the Icls fimple becaufe 

 their exciting caules co-ex'ft in t''e fame 

 ohjcft (tor tids is the fubltance of his re- 

 maik), and the Inquirer, that n.; fenfafi'n 

 is fini) le, but owe» all its fiinjilici'y to the 

 abllraflion wliich the m'nd performs in 

 reviving the ima^e or excltiiig the remem- 

 brance of a p.ariiciilar idea : for this is 

 the fubftance of his remaik. 



Locke does fay in terms that reflec- 

 tion is " the peiccptio'1 ot the operations 

 of our own minds within us :" and that 

 ideas of refleiSlion are fuch as the mind 

 gels " by leH.Lftmg on its own operations 

 within it!rh." I have quoted word fof 

 word : and now let the Inquirer charge 

 compofitors, or whom he will, with for- . 

 gery. It is true I have not quoteil from 

 an edition in the life-time ot Locke, my 

 libraiy, though good, not c ntaining one. 

 But I quoted from the neat apd accurate 

 edition of Dublin in 1765, and no'.v, l^p 

 the i;ui»fn>'-lion of the Inquiier, I quote 

 from ih; handfome London folio of ijz'i, 

 only eighteen years after the death ef that 

 great man, the imprefSon of whofe great- 

 refs I believe is rather ftrengthened han 

 diminiflied after all that the Inquirer has 

 been pleafed to fay. 



The w-ords "lecolleffed" — " of fenfa- 

 tions," are exirarted from the general 

 purport of the two feiftions to which I re- 

 ferred at the foot of the page. One is 

 afliiiTied to notice fuch cavils, and lb wide 

 of the argument, as what he calls my 

 " Pan'hei'ni," fn m the term " our own 

 mind" implying, he fays, that "one mind 

 may be co-nmrn to m re than one indivi. 

 dual." To bring Berkeltiaiiifin into li- 

 dicule with the ignorant, he imputes this 

 dodtrine to Berkeley ; lor the (ame piir- 

 pole he imputes it to me. The woids 

 P p 2 ho ./ever, 



