soo 



Mr. LaJTs Reply to the Inquirer* 



[Nov.l, 



however, are neither Berkeley's nor mine, 

 but Locke's. And individuality of mind 

 fubfilts not in the material or mixt hypo- 

 pothefis better than on the immaterial.— 

 When there is individuality of cSnlciouf- 

 refs, individuality of agency, there is in- 

 dividuality of mind. Nothing can be 

 pcortr than to find or rather make fpino- 

 fifm or pantheifm out of fo common an 

 exprefiionriiLXEls^a "Vvyy^, nojlra mens, nof- 

 tra alma, noire ame j and I might quote 

 Hebiew to the fame purpofe. The lan- 

 guage of converfation and of writing in 

 fo many different age« and countries, 

 might all be tortured into this import.— 

 *' Our mind," in common grammar, com- 

 mon fenle, and common ufe, is the mind 

 which we have individually as other indi- 

 viduals refpedlively have theirs. 



The Inquirer, ho* ever, who muft ob- 

 jeft, and the more widely from the argu- 

 ment the better, fays, that the perception 

 of a fenfation cannot be recolleftcd, be- 

 caufe fenfation implies the prefence and 

 recolltflion the ableivce of theobjc(51 ; but 

 as long a* we can recollefl friends feen, 

 words heard, mulical founds played or 

 fung, the experience of mankind will be 

 contradiftory to the objedion. " Recol- 

 lefted," however, is a wonl which is ex- 

 traiSted from the fenfe of the three feflions 

 quoted, and not literally taken from 

 Locke. 



" Perception of fenfations and opera- 

 tions of mind" is not tautologous : for 

 there are opeiations of mind, which, 

 though occafioned by fenfation, and al- 

 though they may be accompanied wjih it, 

 are not lenlations. What fort of fenfa- 

 tion is the idea of eternity or non-exiftence ? 

 It is true there is no image of non-exift- 

 ence : it has no reality : it is only a fenTa- 

 tion. But it is not the lels a futjeiSt of 

 intellefl and of reafoning. And be it re- 

 coUcfled. that ideas are with Locke what- 

 ever is the objeft of the underltanding in 

 thinking. 



But he muft objeft too that " Mind is 

 made to prove fenfations," which he iays 

 are " Attributes of body only." 



Now take the mixt material fyftem of 

 mind and body, this is abfoluteiy falfe.— 

 Take the fimple material fyftem, it is 

 equally falfe. Body, unlefs organised in- 

 to mind, h^s even on that fyftem no per- 

 ception or fenfation. Thofe who talk of 

 the fenfation of the body wculd do well to 

 think of the phenomena attending an apo. 

 pleftic fit or a catalepfy. There is th? 

 budy entire, the organization not deftroy. 

 4 



ed, but fenfation utterly fufpended during 

 the continuance of the fit, however ftrong 

 the application of exciting caufes. 



Once more, he muft objeft to the term 

 •' within us." And yet he fays, " the 

 mind is necelTarily and always within us." 

 And I perfift to fay, that every hypothefis 

 which will not involve a cnntradiftion 

 muft ultimately refolve all fenfations into 

 the mind. He fays, " Senfation by defi- 

 nition implies contaft with the external 

 world," and infers that therefore all fen- 

 fation murt be without and not within us. 

 And expreftly fays, that it is " falfe and 

 abfurd to place our fenfations within us." 

 What can be neceflary to be faid to fuch 

 philofophy and fuch logic ? 



The Inquirer is angry that a Berkleian 

 fliould be a Lockift. I am neither a 

 Berkleian nor a Lockift, but a reafonift 

 and a truthift. 



The Inquirer bids me, and in the coarf- 

 eft language, to " go into the church and 

 preach the Trinity," or *' preconife," as 

 he calls It, be a cocnmon crier of that doc- 

 trine : for that " it would not be a viler 

 occupation." Had I chofen to preach in 

 the church, I (hould have wanted neither 

 inducement, nor opportunity, nor wifti, 

 nor temptation, during a great part of my 

 life. But though I (ball not preach the 

 Trinity, I fhall not call it a vile occupa- 

 ton ; becaufe good and learned and moft 

 excellent men have believed, and have 

 confequently preached it ; and however 

 vile with my fentimenis it would have 

 been in me, it is no more vile in others 

 to fpeak what they think, than in me to do 

 the fame. 



I fign my name, and the Inquirer does 

 not. He has no inconvenience or reftraint 

 from the language he chufes to employ ; 

 and bethinks perhaps, particularly on this 

 fubje£l, that I may. But my Signing my 

 name fhall iinpofe no reftraint on me ex- 

 cept that of decency, which, whether I 

 had figned it or not, I flatter myfelf I 

 ftiould have obferved. 



His notion of a wi(h In me to teaze 

 him or any one is utterly unfounded. I 

 write to vindicate what I believe to be 

 true and ufeful. If in doing this I hurt 

 the feelings of thofe who think differently, 

 I hurt them unwillingly, and no farther 

 than I think it neceflary. After this the 

 Inquirer may fay what he pleafes ; only 

 it he is not anfwered, do not let it be ima- 

 gined it is becaufe he cannot. 



I 3(n, Sir, &c. Capei. Lofft. 

 TroJign,'-^thSept, 1805. 



