618 
the conflict; each only hoped that the 
#bjects of his own affection were safe, 
and in that hope found some resource 
against the anticipated disgrace of the 
country. 
The storm that succeeded the battle 
tended only to keep alive, through the 
night, the horrors of the day, and to 
prepare them for the melancholy ‘spec- 
tacle of the ensuing morning, when the 
wrecks of their floating bulwarks were 
geen on shore, and’ some, that had es- 
eaped the battle and the storm, entering 
the bay to shelter themselves from the 
pursuit of their victorious enemy. 
The feelings of strong sensibility, 
which had so agitated the minds of the 
people ‘during the conflict, were now di- 
rected to the tender offices of humanity 
towards their wounded countrymen; the 
softer sex attended .on the wharfs to as- 
sist them in landing, to convey them to 
the convents and the hospitals, while the 
priests were administering the last offices 
of religion to those whuse departing spirits 
took their flight before they could reach 
the asylums appointed for their recep- 
tion. When the first emotions had-sub- 
sided, the people of Cadiz strongly ma- 
nifested their contempt of the French, 
whom they accused of having deserted 
them in the hour of battle; and the at- 
tention of Lord Collingwood to the 
wounded Spanish prisoners, induced 
them to contrast the conduct of their ge- 
herous “enemies with that of their trea- 
cherous allies. 
SPANISH CHARACTERISTIC. 
“There is, in the national character of 
Spain, one trait, which equally pervades 
all classes of society; origmating, I con- 
ceive, in the indolence which a warm 
tlimate, and the consequently luxurious 
habirs, produce: this trait is the want of 
combination; the absence of arrange- 
ment. The Spaniards are brave, acute, 
patient, and faithful; but all their cha- 
facteristics are’ insulated ; all their exer- 
tions are individual. They have no idea 
of combining, either publicly or privately, 
in a manner to call forth their respective 
talents, and render every one useful to 
the common cause. r 
The ‘Germans’may be said to combine 
too much, and the Spaniards not at all. 
Tn my judgment the English have attained 
the proper nrédium ; but certainly the 
Spaniards are deficieat in this respect, 
and to this deficiency their reverses may 
all be ascribed. If a commander siiould 
embark ‘on an expedition, like that to 
Algiers # few years ogo, it is not iunproe 
SPT BR. 
Mr. Jacobs Letters from Spatit. 
bable that the powder would be conveyed 
in one ship and the balls in another; so 
that if one were lust or delayed the other 
would prove useless; nor would it be uns 
likely to happen in their army, that ball? 
cartridges might be delivered to the sul- 
diers for a review, and blank-cartridges 
for actual service; for I have seen errors 
committed equally esregious. 
Nothing is more certain than that thé 
Spanish nation, generally, is roused to 
madness against France: few are to bé 
found who would not willingly plunge a 
dagyer into the breast of a Frenchman 
whenever the occasion might offer, but 
there is no government, no ruling mind; 
to concentrate this universal feeling : 
whatever is done by Spamiards is indivi= 
dual effort, not combined exettion; and 
when they have attempted military ope- 
rations on a great scale, they have been 
uniformly unsuccessful: they have only 
chosen the wrong means of warfare; and 
even should their armies be dispersed, 
and their strong towns taken (€vents 
which I anticipate) the invaders will be 
so far fram conquest, that a warfare will 
commence of the most destructive species 
for France, and the most secure for 
Spain: then will those conflicts begin in 
which individual exertion is every thing, 
and combination unnecessary. From 
the defiles and mountains, where they 
will remain sheltered and concealed will 
Opportunities offer, the Spaniards will 
harass and massacre the French in detail ;. 
they will prevent all mtercourse between 
the different towns; they will ‘stop cul- 
tivation in the plains; and perhaps, after: 
years of ‘onfusion and bloodshed, drive 
the French, as they formerly did the 
Moors, from their soil. 4 
GIBRAETAR. 
This place is so well known, and has 
been so-often described, that I have few 
observations to make which have any 
pretensions to novelty: the ‘principal 
batteries are casemated, and traverses 
are constructed within them to prevent 
the mischief which might arise from the 
explosions of shells. The principal 
strength of the place depends on_ the 
shortness of the line of defence, and the 
prodigious flanking fires which may an- 
noy an enemy from ‘the projecting parts 
of the rock on the north-east, The most 
‘extraordinary works are the galleries, ex- 
cavated from the solid rock, in which 
loop holes are formed for the reception 
of cannon of large caliber; these guns ~ 
are pointed to the narrow causeway, 
which alone gives a passage to “the 
: 1 
towns 
ee 
