Professor Stewart's History of the Progress of Philosophy. 



they described the mind as a spirit, or 

 a^H spark of celestial fire, employed (hese 

 expressions, not with any intention to 

 materialize its essence, but merely from 

 want of more unexceptionable language, 

 might be shewn with demonstrative evi. 

 deuce, if this were the proper place for 

 entering into the discussion. But what 

 is .if more importance to be attended to, 

 on the present occasion, is the effect of 

 Descartes' writings in disentangling the 

 logical principle above mentioned, trom 

 the ^clw)la6tic question about the nSture 

 of mind, as contradistinguished from 

 matter. It were indeed to be wished 

 tliat he had perceived still more clearly 

 and steadily the essential importance of 

 keeping this distinction constantly in 

 vie" ; but he had at least the merit of 

 illustrating, by his own example, in a 

 far greater degree than any of his pre- 

 decessors, the possibility of studying the 

 mental phenomena, without reference to 

 any facts but those which rest on the 

 evidence of consciousness. The metn. 

 physical question about the naturG of be necessarily involved in the idea h« 



583 



body. The only thing that appeared to 

 him certain and incontrovertible, was his 

 own existence; by which, he repeatedly 

 reminds us, we are to understand merely 

 the existence of his mind, abstracted 

 from all consideration of the material 

 organs connected with it. About every 

 other proposition, he conceived, that 

 doubts might reasonably be entertained; 

 but to suppose the mm-existence of that 

 which thinks, at the very in;ment it is 

 conscious of thinking, appeared to hina 

 a contradiction in terms. From this 

 tingle postulatuin, accordingly, he took 

 his departure ; resolved to admit nothing 

 as a philosophical truth, which could not 

 be deduced from it by a chain of logical 

 reasoning. 



Having first satisfied himself of his 

 own existence, his next step was to in- 

 quire how far his perceptive and intel- 

 lectual faculties were entitled to credit. 

 For this purpose, he begins with offering 

 a proof of the existence and attributes 

 of God; — truths which he conceived to 



mind he seems to have considered as a 

 problem, the solution of which was an 

 easy corollary from these fad!:, if dis- 

 tinctly apprehended ; but still as n pro- 

 blem, whereof it is possible that different 

 views might be taken by those who 

 agreed in opinion, as far as facts alone 

 were concerned. Of this a very remark- 

 able example has since occurred in the 

 case of Mr. Locke, who, although he has 

 been at great pains to shew that the 

 piiwer of refection bears the same rela- 

 tion to the study of the mental pheno- 

 mena which the power of observation 

 bears to the study of the material world, 

 appears, nevertheless, to have been far 

 less decided than Descartes with respect 

 to the essentiitl distinction between Mind 

 and Matter; and has even gone so far 

 as to hazard the unguarded proposition, 

 that there is no absurdity in supposing 

 the Deity to have superadded to the 



was able to form of a perfect, self-ex- 

 istent, and eternal being. Ilis reasou- 

 ings on this point it would be useless to 

 state. It 1* sufficient t) observe, that 

 tliey led him to conclude that God can- 

 not possibly be supposed to deceive his 

 creatures; and, therefore, that the inti- 

 mations of our senses, and the decisions 

 of our reason, are to be trusted to with 

 entire confidence, whenever they afford 

 us clear and distinct ideas of their re- 

 speftive objects. 



As Descartes conceived the existence 

 of God (next to the existence of his own 

 mind) to be the most indisputable of all 

 truths, and rested his confidence in the 

 conclusions of human reason entiiely oa 

 his faith in the divine veracity, it is not 

 surprising that he should have rfjc-cted 

 the arguiTient from fiial causes, as supers 

 fluous and unsatisfactory. To have 

 availed himself of its assistance, would 



other qualities of matter the power of not only have betrayed a want of confi- 



tJiinking. His scepticism, however, on dence in what he professed to regard as 



this point did not prevent his good sense much more certain than any mathenia- 



from perceiving, with the most complete tical theorem; but woiJ I obviously have 



conviction, the indispensable necessity of exposed him to the char{:e ot first ap. 



abstracting from the analogy of matter, pealing to the divine attributes in proof 



in studying the laws of our intellectual 

 frame. 



Among the various articles of common 

 belief which Descartes prDposed to sub- 

 ject to a severe scrutiny, he enumerates, 

 particularly, the conclusiveness of mathe- 

 matical demonstration ; the existence of 

 God; the existence of the material 

 world] and even the existence of bis own 



of the authority of his faculties, and af- 

 terwards of appealing to these faculties 

 in proof of the existence of God. 



Among the principal articles of the 

 Cartesian philosophy, which are now in» 

 corporated with our prevailing and most 

 accredited doctrines, the following seem 

 to me to be chiefly entitled to notice! 



1, His luminous exposition of the 

 coinmoH 



